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Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between religious affiliation and support for a constitutional amendment
banning same-sex marriage, and how this relationship changes over the course of the campaign. There is a
demonstrable connection between religious beliefs and partisan and ideological preferences in the United
States (Patrikios 2008; Campbell 2007; Layman 2001). Using Proposition 8 in California (2008) as my
primary case study, I consider how religion shapes voter behavior specifically in same-sex marriage ballot
propositions and how moral policy decisions most clearly expose the link between religious beliefs and
ideological preferences. I find that the predictive capacity of religion with respect to Proposition 8 vote choice
increases for the non-Christian vote over the course of the 2008 campaign cycle. In contrast, religion produces
stable voting preferences among Christian voters throughout the campaign. From these results, I conclude
that the religion effect on non-Christian Proposition 8 vote choice is magnified when accompanied by
campaign mobilization, same-sex marriage political salience and the effect of public opinion. My analysis
shows that the religion effect, coupled with California’s political opportunity structure, stabilizes Christian
Proposition 8 vote preference, while increasing opposition amongst non-Christian Proposition 8 voters over
the course of the campaign (Soule 2004). While campaign effects narrowed the gap between “yes” and “no”
votes on Proposition 8, California’s ballot initiative system ultimately favors moral policy outcomes that
resonate with deeply held religious beliefs (Haider-Markel and Meier 1999). Drawing on survey data from the
Public Policy Institute of California, I argue that same-sex marriage electoral outcomes are a product of timely
campaign mobilization tactics, the unique California voter initiative system, and religion effects that
simultaneously stabilize voting patterns among Christian voters and provide opportunities for non-Christian
voters to mobilize against same-sex marriage bans.
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Abstract	  	  This	  paper	  explores	  the	  relationship	  between	  religious	  affiliation	  and	  support	  for	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  banning	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  and	  how	  this	  relationship	  changes	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  campaign.	  	  There	  is	  a	  demonstrable	  connection	  between	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  partisan	  and	  ideological	  preferences	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (Patrikios	  2008;	  Campbell	  2007;	  Layman	  2001).	  Using	  Proposition	  8	  in	  California	  (2008)	  as	  my	  primary	  case	  study,	  I	  consider	  how	  religion	  shapes	  voter	  behavior	  specifically	  in	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  ballot	  propositions	  and	  how	  moral	  policy	  decisions	  most	  clearly	  expose	  the	  link	  between	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  ideological	  preferences.	  I	  find	  that	  the	  predictive	  capacity	  of	  religion	  with	  respect	  to	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  increases	  for	  the	  non-­‐Christian	  vote	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  2008	  campaign	  cycle.	  In	  contrast,	  religion	  produces	  stable	  voting	  preferences	  among	  Christian	  voters	  throughout	  the	  campaign.	  From	  these	  results,	  I	  conclude	  that	  the	  religion	  effect	  on	  non-­‐Christian	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  is	  magnified	  when	  accompanied	  by	  campaign	  mobilization,	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  political	  salience	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  public	  opinion.	  My	  analysis	  shows	  that	  the	  religion	  effect,	  coupled	  with	  California’s	  political	  opportunity	  structure,	  stabilizes	  Christian	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  preference,	  while	  increasing	  opposition	  amongst	  non-­‐Christian	  Proposition	  8	  voters	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  campaign	  (Soule	  2004).	  While	  campaign	  effects	  narrowed	  the	  gap	  between	  “yes”	  and	  “no”	  votes	  on	  Proposition	  8,	  California’s	  ballot	  initiative	  system	  ultimately	  favors	  moral	  policy	  outcomes	  that	  resonate	  with	  deeply	  held	  religious	  beliefs	  (Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999).	  Drawing	  on	  survey	  data	  from	  the	  Public	  Policy	  Institute	  of	  California,	  I	  argue	  that	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  electoral	  outcomes	  are	  a	  product	  of	  timely	  campaign	  mobilization	  tactics,	  the	  unique	  California	  voter	  initiative	  system,	  and	  religion	  effects	  that	  simultaneously	  stabilize	  voting	  patterns	  among	  Christian	  voters	  and	  provide	  opportunities	  for	  non-­‐Christian	  voters	  to	  mobilize	  against	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans.	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I. Introduction	  
	  
A. Religion	  and	  Morality	  Politics	  
	   Over	  the	  last	  half	  century,	  religion	  has	  been	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  battles	  about	  moral	  and	  cultural	  politics.	  Paradoxically,	  in	  a	  nation	  that	  values	  free	  exercise	  and	  religious	  pluralism,	  religion	  has	  become	  polarizing	  and	  religious	  affiliations	  play	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  political	  attitudes	  and	  behavior	  of	  American	  voters	  (Micklethwait	  and	  Wooldridge	  2009).	  These	  religious	  affiliations,	  while	  deeply	  connected	  to	  political	  attitudes,	  particularly	  those	  concerning	  moral	  and	  cultural	  issues,	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  transcend	  partisan	  affiliations	  and	  other	  demographic	  allegiances	  and	  take	  on	  their	  own	  unique	  identities	  in	  the	  political	  sphere.	  Religious	  beliefs	  and	  political	  attitudes	  reinforce	  each	  other	  independent	  of	  other	  demographic	  identifications.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  religious	  experiences	  are	  frequently	  politicized;	  on	  the	  other,	  political	  behavior	  is	  frequently	  shaped	  by	  moral	  attitudes	  created	  and	  influenced	  by	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  religious	  traditionalism	  (Layman	  2001;	  Patrikios	  2008).	  As	  a	  result,	  moral	  policies	  are	  created	  when	  deeply	  held	  religious	  beliefs	  conflate	  with	  political	  attitudes	  and	  prevail	  over	  the	  attitudes	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “religious	  left”	  coalitions,	  an	  amalgamation	  of	  religiously	  unaffiliated,	  moderate	  believers	  and	  generally	  self-­‐identifying	  liberal	  individuals	  (Campbell	  2007;	  Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999;	  Layman	  2001).	  	  	  Although	  religion	  has	  always	  been	  a	  forceful	  presence	  and	  important	  foundation	  in	  American	  politics,	  its	  character	  has	  changed	  greatly	  over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years.	  The	  changing	  face	  of	  “political	  religion”	  attempts	  to	  satisfy	  the	  shifting	  needs	  of	  American	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political	  parties,	  while	  adjusting	  to	  new	  salient	  issues,	  revolving	  and	  unpredictable	  issue	  coalitions,	  and	  shifting	  elite	  preferences	  (Layman	  2001).	  Religion	  has	  the	  power	  to	  mobilize	  public	  opinion	  and	  ignite	  moral-­‐centric	  political	  debates	  on	  hotly	  contested	  social	  issues	  such	  as	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  abortion,	  gambling,	  assisted	  suicide,	  the	  death	  penalty,	  stem-­‐cell	  research	  and	  prostitution	  (Mooney	  1999).	  The	  interaction	  between	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  and	  religion	  and	  the	  resulting	  debates	  offer	  implications	  for	  policy	  outcomes	  of	  other	  morality-­‐based	  issues.	  	  In	  particular,	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  ballot	  initiative	  processes	  intensify	  moral	  policy	  mobilization	  and	  facilitate	  the	  enactment	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans.	  Bringing	  contentious,	  morally	  grounded	  issues	  such	  as	  a	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  into	  electoral	  politics	  not	  only	  expands	  the	  scope	  of	  conflict	  among	  ordinary	  citizens,	  but	  it	  also	  capitalizes	  on	  pre-­‐existing	  advantages:	  longstanding,	  strong	  religious	  institutions	  can	  more	  effectively	  reach	  voters	  and	  manipulate	  public	  opinion	  than	  their	  unaffiliated,	  non-­‐religious	  counterparts	  (Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999).	  Non-­‐religious	  voting	  blocs	  rely	  on	  campaign	  strategies	  and	  elite	  allies	  and	  do	  not	  have	  the	  benefit	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  institutional	  support.	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  politics	  is	  most	  entrenched	  in	  matters	  of	  sex	  and	  family	  (Putnam	  and	  Campbell	  2010).	  Same-­‐sex	  marriage	  falls	  within	  this	  classification	  and	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  most	  divisive	  and	  prevalent	  political	  issues	  in	  recent	  statewide	  elections.	  Attitudes	  toward	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  are	  closely	  tied	  to	  religiosity;	  the	  John	  Putnam	  and	  David	  E.	  Campbell	  “Faith	  Matters”	  survey	  reveals	  that	  as	  religiosity	  increases	  (as	  a	  function	  of	  church	  attendance),	  there	  is	  over	  a	  three-­‐fold	  increase	  in	  opposition	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  (Putnam	  and	  Campbell	  2010).	  Furthermore,	  religious	  belief	  is	  highly	  correlated	  with	  Republican	  Party	  membership,	  suggesting	  a	  partisan	  preference	  for	  same-­‐
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sex	  marriage	  bans	  (Putnam	  and	  Campbell	  2010;	  Campbell	  2007).	  The	  moral	  underpinnings	  and	  recent	  legislative	  controversies	  that	  characterize	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  policy	  give	  the	  issue	  both	  religious	  context	  and	  political	  salience.	  	  	   In	  light	  of	  existing	  scholarship,	  the	  relationship	  between	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  political	  attitudes	  in	  many	  ways	  defines	  the	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  debate.	  In	  recent	  years,	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  debate	  have	  accomplished	  significant	  statewide	  victories.	  States	  vary	  dramatically	  in	  their	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  laws,	  but	  electoral	  and	  legislative	  decisions	  do	  not	  always	  reflect	  the	  prevailing	  partisan	  coalitions	  and	  dominating	  political	  ideologies	  of	  the	  state	  (Lax	  and	  Phillips	  2009).	  Reflecting	  on	  this	  possible	  inconsistency,	  I	  find	  that	  the	  correlation	  between	  religion,	  political	  partisanship	  and	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  policy	  outcomes	  is	  permeated	  by	  the	  degree	  religious	  beliefs	  exhibited	  by	  the	  electorate,	  ideological	  preferences	  of	  state	  legislative	  elites	  and	  the	  electoral	  institutions	  responsible	  for	  passing	  legislation	  (Campbell	  2007;	  Layman	  2001;	  Soule	  2004).	  The	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  debate	  does	  not	  align	  directly	  along	  partisan	  and	  ideological	  lines	  (i.e	  where	  liberal	  voters	  would	  oppose	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans,	  while	  conservative	  voters	  would	  support	  bans).	  The	  influence	  of	  religion	  is	  more	  complex;	  the	  total	  impact	  of	  religious	  belief	  and	  religious	  traditionalism	  on	  political	  ideology	  is	  indirect	  and	  most	  apparent	  when	  channeled	  through	  opinions	  on	  moral	  and	  cultural	  issues	  (Layman	  2001).	  	  Figure	  5	  represents	  Geoffrey	  Layman’s	  sequence	  linking	  religious	  belief	  with	  political	  orientation	  and	  vote	  choice	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  moral	  and	  cultural	  attitudes.	  He	  argues	  that	  moral	  policymaking	  is	  the	  avenue	  through	  which	  religious	  belief	  produces	  ideological	  preferences	  (Layman	  2001).	  The	  relationship	  between	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  political	  attitudes	  can	  be	  examined	  through	  the	  unique	  and	  telling	  lens	  of	  same-­‐sex	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marriage	  policymaking,	  and	  more	  specifically	  by	  examining	  the	  effect	  of	  religion	  on	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  in	  California	  (2008).1	  This	  paper	  contributes	  to	  the	  broad	  body	  of	  literature	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  politics	  and,	  more	  generally,	  to	  literature	  on	  the	  relationships	  between	  social	  movements,	  public	  opinion	  and	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  and	  the	  affinity	  between	  moral	  policymaking,	  deeply	  held	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  citizen	  ballot	  initiatives	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (Soule	  2004;	  Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999).	  Furthermore,	  this	  paper	  adds	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  changing	  landscape	  of	  religious	  belief	  and	  political	  partisanship	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (Campbell	  2007;	  Layman	  2001;	  Putnam	  and	  Campbell	  2010).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  Proposition	  8,	  I	  examine	  the	  voting	  behavior	  of	  members	  of	  Christian	  denominations	  with	  relatively	  strong	  levels	  of	  religious	  devotion	  (Smidt	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  This	  broad	  coalition	  of	  religious	  individuals	  constitutes	  a	  formidable	  social	  movement	  that	  is	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  profoundly	  engaged	  in	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  ban	  legislation.	  I	  also	  examine	  the	  way	  campaigns	  for	  or	  against	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  contribute	  to	  public	  opinion,	  specifically	  among	  non-­‐religious	  voters	  opposed	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  (Thorson	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Morality	  politics	  theory,	  campaign	  effects,	  initiative	  systems	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  religious	  beliefs,	  moral	  policymaking	  and	  political	  attitudes,	  provide	  specific	  lenses	  for	  the	  understanding	  and	  interpretation	  of	  the	  electoral	  outcome	  of	  Proposition	  8	  in	  California.	  	  I	  combine	  multiple	  theoretical	  approaches,	  religiously	  and	  non-­‐religiously	  focused,	  and	  use	  an	  empirical	  analysis	  to	  interpret	  the	  electoral	  outcome	  of	  Proposition	  8	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Proposition	  8	  (November	  2008)	  was	  a	  statewide	  ballot	  initiative	  in	  California.	  Proposition	  8	  was	  passed	  overturning	  a	  June	  2008	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  California	  decision	  and	  effectively	  banned	  same-­‐sex	  marriages	  in	  the	  state.	  2	  The	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church,	  The	  Knights	  of	  Columbus,	  the	  California	  Catholic	  Conference,	  The	  Church	  of	  Jesus	  Christ	  and	  Latter	  Day	  Saints,	  an	  Evangelical	  Christian	  group	  led	  by	  Jim	  Garlow	  and	  Miles	  McPherson	  and	  Rick	  Warren,	  pastor	  of	  the	  Saddleback	  Church	  all	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California	  (2008).	  I	  will	  first	  provide	  more	  detailed	  background	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  debates	  and	  policy	  explanations	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  specifically	  in	  California.	  After	  introducing	  my	  argument	  and	  hypotheses,	  I	  will	  proceed	  with	  a	  theoretical	  argument	  based	  on	  morality	  and	  interest	  group	  politics	  theory,	  the	  institutional	  strength	  of	  religious	  traditionalists,	  the	  California	  political	  opportunity	  structure,	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  elite	  fueled	  public	  opinion	  mobilization.	  I	  will	  conclude	  with	  an	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  from	  the	  2008	  election	  cycle.	  	  
B. Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage	  Policies	  in	  the	  United	  States	  	  Same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  became	  an	  important	  part	  of	  electoral	  politics	  in	  the	  United	  States	  following	  the	  federal	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act	  (DOMA)	  passed	  in	  1996	  by	  President	  Bill	  Clinton	  (Soule	  2004).	  DOMA	  seeks	  to	  define	  marriage,	  at	  the	  federal	  level,	  as	  a	  legal	  union	  between	  one	  man	  and	  one	  woman.	  DOMA	  allows	  states	  to	  choose	  to	  void	  same-­‐sex	  marriages	  performed	  legally	  elsewhere	  (Soule	  2004).	  In	  effect,	  this	  legislation	  rendered	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  salient	  for	  voters,	  labeling	  it	  a	  moral	  and	  political	  issue	  that	  could	  be	  solved	  through	  both	  state	  and	  federal	  legislation.	  The	  passage	  of	  DOMA	  presented	  a	  critical	  juncture	  in	  the	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  debate	  and	  significantly	  influenced	  a	  string	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  state	  bans	  over	  the	  next	  decade.	  	  While	  DOMA	  contributed	  to	  the	  rise	  in	  state-­‐level	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  legislation,	  the	  politicization	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  existed	  prior	  to	  DOMA’s	  passage.	  The	  first	  legislative	  ban	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  came	  in	  1973	  in	  Texas.	  Between	  the	  1970’s	  and	  1990’s	  a	  slew	  of	  court	  cases	  contesting	  marriage	  licenses	  for	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  surfaced	  in	  multiple	  states.	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What	  was	  lacking	  was	  a	  codified	  decision-­‐making	  apparatus	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans.	  Until	  DOMA,	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  disputes	  were	  primarily	  decided	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis;	  DOMA	  made	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  a	  matter	  of	  public	  policy	  (Soule	  2004).	  The	  legislation	  effectively	  removed	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  from	  the	  private	  sphere	  and	  created	  a	  space	  for	  ordinary	  citizens	  to	  push	  their	  states	  to	  adopt	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  legislation	  as	  a	  response	  to	  federal	  law.	  States	  with	  provisions	  for	  ballot	  initiatives	  facilitated	  the	  enactment	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  legislation	  (Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999).	  The	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  debate	  fell	  onto	  ordinary	  citizens,	  particularly	  those	  with	  morally	  conservative	  views	  and	  a	  deep	  faith	  in	  biblical	  teachings.	  The	  passage	  of	  DOMA	  allowed	  these	  citizens	  ample	  opportunity	  to	  legislate	  morality	  in	  their	  respective	  states.	  	  Currently,	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  is	  legal	  in	  five	  states:	  Vermont	  (2001),	  Massachusetts	  (2004),	  Connecticut	  (2008),	  Iowa	  (2009),	  and	  New	  Hampshire	  (2010).	  Same-­‐sex	  marriage	  is	  also	  legal	  in	  Washington	  D.C.	  (2009)	  and	  in	  the	  Coquille	  Indian	  Tribe	  in	  Oregon	  (2009);	  however,	  even	  though	  Oregon	  voted	  to	  ban	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  2004	  (freedomtomarry.org).	  Electoral	  institutions,	  ideological	  trends,	  elite	  preferences,	  public	  opinion	  and	  campaign	  trends	  in	  these	  states	  contributed	  to	  their	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  policy	  outcomes	  (Broder	  2000;	  Layman	  2001;	  Zaller	  1992;	  Soule	  2004).	  In	  these	  five	  states,	  Washington	  D.C.	  and	  the	  Coquille	  Indian	  Tribe,	  legislation	  legalizing	  same-­‐sex	  marriages	  occurred	  under	  distinctive	  conditions	  that	  favored	  policymaking	  by	  elites,	  rather	  than	  ordinary	  citizens	  (Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999).	  Government	  by	  ballot	  initiative	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  conflates	  with	  religion	  to	  produce	  electoral	  outcomes	  that	  favor	  moral	  policymaking.	  This	  further	  exemplifies	  the	  strong,	  indirect	  effect	  that	  religion	  exhibits	  in	  moral	  issues,	  particularly	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  policies.	  Religion	  casts	  its	  influence	  through	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mechanisms,	  such	  as	  ballot	  initiatives	  and	  ideological	  preferences	  to	  exert	  its	  influence	  in	  the	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  debate.	  	  California,	  the	  most	  avid	  user	  of	  ballot	  initiatives	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  became	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  despite	  dominant	  state	  political	  ideology	  (Broder	  2000;	  Lax	  and	  Phillips	  2009).	  Conversely,	  in	  states	  like	  Iowa	  that	  lack	  a	  ballot	  initiative	  policymaking	  apparatus,	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  are	  harder	  to	  accomplish	  
regardless	  of	  dominant	  state	  political	  ideology.	  The	  presence	  of	  ballot	  initiative	  systems	  can	  be	  integrated	  with	  religious	  effects	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans.	  Moral	  policies	  are	  more	  successful	  via	  ballot	  initiatives	  because	  versus	  legislative	  decisions,	  ballot	  initiatives	  involve	  more	  people	  and	  more	  diverse	  opinions	  and	  thus	  expand	  spheres	  of	  conflict	  and	  favor	  views	  that	  require	  low	  voter	  awareness.	  These	  policymaking	  conditions	  characterize	  morality	  politics	  theory	  (Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999).	  Ballot	  initiatives	  and	  moral	  policies	  work	  in	  tandem	  to	  produce	  electoral	  outcomes	  that	  uphold	  more	  conservative	  worldviews.	  Initiatives	  in	  general	  do	  not	  ignite	  high	  levels	  of	  citizen	  participation,	  and	  since	  morally	  grounded	  issues	  rely	  less	  on	  the	  cognitive	  engagement	  of	  voters	  and	  more	  on	  intuitive	  beliefs,	  electoral	  outcomes	  will	  favor	  low-­‐involvement	  decisions	  (Scholzman	  and	  Yohani	  2008;	  Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999).	  The	  combination	  of	  deeply	  held	  values	  and	  ballot	  initiatives	  make	  moral	  policies	  more	  salient	  for	  larger	  numbers	  of	  voters.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  states	  without	  a	  system	  of	  voter	  initiatives	  have	  more	  limited	  spheres	  of	  conflict	  and	  create	  conditions	  more	  favorable	  to	  interest	  group	  politics	  theory	  (Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999).	  	  When	  the	  decision	  makers	  are	  elites	  in	  state	  legislatures	  rather	  than	  ordinary	  citizens,	  lobbyists	  can	  successfully	  push	  their	  agendas	  using	  more	  discrete	  tactics	  and	  focusing	  more	  adeptly	  on	  those	  lawmakers	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that	  are	  most	  sympathetic	  to	  their	  cause.	  These	  decisions	  can	  be	  made	  without	  actively	  alienating	  blocs	  of	  voters	  and	  rousing	  the	  emotionally	  driven	  sentiments	  of	  voters	  with	  deeply	  held	  moral	  values.	  The	  success	  of	  moral	  policymaking	  by	  ballot	  initiative	  was	  ultimately	  realized	  in	  the	  2004	  election.	  Multiple	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  passed	  during	  this	  election	  via	  ballot	  initiatives,	  whereas	  following	  2004,	  the	  five	  states	  that	  legalized	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  did	  so	  through	  private,	  elite-­‐focused	  means.	  	  
C. Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage	  and	  Political	  Partisanship	  after	  2004;	  Paving	  the	  Way	  
to	  Proposition	  8	  	   Applying	  the	  framework	  of	  morality	  politics	  theory,	  and	  using	  the	  electoral	  outcome	  of	  2004	  as	  a	  compass,	  we	  can	  interpret	  more	  recent	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  debates.	  Following	  the	  passage	  of	  DOMA,	  the	  eruption	  of	  state	  initiatives	  both	  for	  and	  against	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  mobilized	  social	  movements.	  This	  type	  of	  group	  activity	  peaked	  during	  the	  2004	  Presidential	  election,	  when	  eleven	  states	  had	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  legislation	  on	  the	  ballot	  (Campbell	  2007;	  Campbell	  and	  Monson	  2007).	  Christian	  based	  religious	  groups	  and	  organizations	  (Protestants,	  Mormons,	  Catholics	  and	  non-­‐denominational	  Christians)	  were	  some	  of	  the	  key	  actors	  in	  social	  movements	  favoring	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans.2	  	  The	  organizational	  behavior	  and	  strong	  institutionalism	  of	  these	  groups	  ultimately	  created	  conditions	  conducive	  to	  the	  type	  of	  voter	  behavior	  predicted	  by	  morality	  politics	  theory.	  The	  2004	  election	  and	  the	  eleven	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  initiatives	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  California’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church,	  The	  Knights	  of	  Columbus,	  the	  California	  Catholic	  Conference,	  The	  Church	  of	  Jesus	  Christ	  and	  Latter	  Day	  Saints,	  an	  Evangelical	  Christian	  group	  led	  by	  Jim	  Garlow	  and	  Miles	  McPherson	  and	  Rick	  Warren,	  pastor	  of	  the	  Saddleback	  Church	  all	  endorsed	  and	  mobilized	  members	  in	  favor	  of	  Proposition	  8.	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action	  in	  2008.	  	  While	  in	  2004	  the	  predictive	  capacity	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  vote	  choice	  on	  presidential	  vote	  choice	  (i.e.	  for	  Bush	  or	  Kerry)	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant,	  revealing	  a	  gap	  between	  moral	  beliefs	  and	  partisan	  preferences,	  the	  increased	  prominence	  of	  the	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  debate	  created	  a	  new	  prism	  through	  which	  one	  can	  isolate	  the	  connection	  between	  religious	  belief	  and	  voter	  behavior.	  David	  E.	  Campbell’s	  A	  Matter	  of	  Faith	  examines	  moral	  policymaking	  after	  the	  2004	  election	  and	  considers	  the	  religion	  effect	  on	  voter	  behavior	  in	  a	  new	  framework.	  His	  work	  emphasizes	  religious	  traditionalism	  and	  religious	  orthodoxy,	  regardless	  of	  specific	  faith	  membership.	  When	  religious	  beliefs	  conflate	  with	  political	  attitudes,	  particularly	  those	  that	  are	  morally	  framed,	  denominational	  affiliations	  become	  less	  significant	  than	  devotional	  style	  or	  religious	  orthodoxy.	  Instead,	  a	  “coalition	  of	  the	  religious”	  emerges,	  where	  religious	  traditionalism,	  not	  religious	  membership,	  constrains	  opinions	  and	  ultimately	  lowers	  cognitive	  dissonance	  among	  voters	  across	  issue	  areas	  (Campbell	  2007;	  Baron	  2003).	  	  While	  these	  religious	  coalitions	  are	  influential	  today,	  they	  are	  relatively	  new	  to	  the	  political	  sphere	  and	  their	  long-­‐term	  survival	  remains	  untested.	  They	  encompass	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  contradictions	  that	  may	  ultimately	  prove	  disruptive	  to	  future	  success	  and	  fatal	  to	  their	  longevity	  (Campbell	  2007).	  While	  the	  Religious	  Right	  was	  once	  comprised	  solely	  of	  white	  Evangelicals,	  these	  coalitions	  cast	  a	  wider	  net,	  fueled	  by	  partisan	  needs,	  campaign	  strategies	  and	  similar	  moral	  reference	  points.	  For	  example,	  despite	  many	  opposing	  beliefs,	  Evangelicals	  and	  Mormons	  now	  break	  bread	  together	  at	  the	  Republican	  table	  and	  advocate	  for	  the	  same	  moral	  policies	  (Campbell	  2007;	  Perry	  v.	  Schwarzenegger	  2010).	  	  Likewise,	  Democratic	  coalitions	  encompass	  the	  unaffiliated	  (i.e.,	  agnostics	  and	  atheists),	  religious	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minorities	  (i.e.,	  reform	  and	  moderate	  Jews)	  and	  moderate	  Christians,	  each	  group	  with	  vastly	  divergent	  religious	  preferences	  and	  beliefs	  (Campbell	  2007).	  	  Despite	  the	  unpredictable	  long-­‐term	  stability	  and	  success	  of	  these	  coalitions,	  they	  remain	  a	  crucial	  political	  fixture	  that	  is	  both	  unique	  and	  particularly	  important	  in	  deciphering	  the	  post-­‐2004	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  debate.	  These	  “left”	  and	  “right”	  coalitions	  produce	  different	  approaches	  to	  state	  politics.	  While	  orthodox	  coalitions	  confront	  policymaking	  from	  a	  spiritual	  and	  biblically	  motivated	  approach,	  less	  traditionalist	  coalitions	  adapt	  moral	  policy	  preferences	  from	  a	  social	  welfare	  perspective	  (Hutcheson	  and	  Taylor,	  1973).	  	  	  Orthodox	  coalitions	  cite	  the	  bible	  in	  their	  opposition	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage;	  conversely,	  “religious	  left”	  coalitions	  treat	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  as	  an	  equal	  rights	  issue.	  While	  the	  survey	  I	  use	  for	  my	  analysis	  does	  not	  contain	  a	  measure	  for	  religious	  traditionalism	  (i.e.	  church	  attendance),	  I	  cluster	  religious	  groups	  as	  Christian	  or	  non-­‐Christian	  according	  to	  denominational	  membership	  and	  generally	  accepted	  church	  attendance	  trends	  (Smidt,	  et	  al.	  2008).	  	  Campbell’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  changing	  religious-­‐political	  scene	  provides	  an	  apt	  foundation	  for	  interpreting	  the	  electoral	  outcome	  of	  California’s	  Proposition	  8.	  	  While	  there	  may	  be	  conflict	  among	  religious	  coalitions	  in	  the	  Republican	  Party,	  the	  degrees	  of	  traditionalism	  and	  orthodoxy	  within	  these	  coalitions	  remain	  consistent;	  therefore,	  opinions	  in	  Republican	  religious	  coalitions	  are	  homogeneous	  regardless	  of	  faith	  membership.	  These	  voters	  do	  not	  have	  to	  fill	  gaps	  in	  their	  policy	  preferences	  according	  to	  heuristics	  and	  elite	  opinions,	  but	  can	  instead	  look	  inward	  to	  their	  deeply	  held	  values;	  their	  information	  search	  is	  internal	  and	  they	  adapt	  their	  policy	  preferences	  from	  previously	  absorbed	  teachings	  of	  their	  religious	  organizations.	  Meanwhile,	  opposing	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  coalitions	  must	  raise	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awareness	  for	  their	  causes	  through	  external	  sources,	  such	  as	  elite	  endorsements	  and	  public	  opinion	  manipulation	  (Zaller	  1992;	  Baron	  2003).	  Thus,	  Republican	  religious	  coalitions	  have	  to	  adjust	  their	  views	  on	  moral	  and	  cultural	  policies	  less	  than	  their	  Democratic	  counterparts	  revealing	  a	  bias	  toward	  conservative	  moral	  policymaking	  (Campbell	  2007;	  Baron	  2003).	  Issues	  like	  the	  Iraq	  War	  and	  the	  economy	  align	  more	  clearly	  along	  partisan	  lines	  and	  create	  a	  more	  level	  playing	  field	  for	  Republicans	  and	  Democrats	  (Layman	  2001).	  However,	  moral	  and	  cultural	  issues	  disrupt	  and	  fragment	  these	  partisan	  identifications	  and	  ultimately	  favor	  the	  Republican	  Party	  and	  the	  Religious	  Right.	  Campbell’s	  characterization	  of	  the	  “religious	  left”	  (i.e.,	  religious	  minorities,	  centrists	  and	  the	  unaffiliated	  and	  non-­‐believers)	  suggests	  a	  grim	  outcome:	  irreconcilable	  ideological	  heterogeneity	  yields	  more	  limited	  abilities	  to	  communicate,	  recruit	  and	  mobilize	  existing	  and	  potential	  members.	  While	  the	  Religious	  Right	  can	  be	  located	  via	  churches	  and	  other	  institutionally	  grounded	  faith-­‐based	  organizations,	  the	  “religious	  left”	  is	  less	  concentrated	  and	  thus	  much	  harder	  to	  locate,	  target	  and	  mobilize.	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  Campbell’s	  identification	  of	  this	  group	  as	  “religious”	  is	  loose	  and	  used	  more	  to	  parallel	  the	  “Religious	  Right”	  designation,	  rather	  than	  characterize	  the	  group	  as	  religious	  at	  all.	  My	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  in	  the	  electoral	  outcome	  of	  Proposition	  8	  will	  extend	  Campbell’s	  framework	  and	  elucidate	  the	  consistent	  institutional	  strength	  of	  the	  Religious	  Right,	  particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  moral	  ballot	  initiatives.	  Furthermore,	  my	  analysis	  will	  explain	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  and	  highlight	  the	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  “religious	  left”	  and	  their	  failure	  to	  achieve	  success	  in	  moral	  legislation.	  	  Campbell’s	  broad	  evaluation	  of	  the	  religion	  factor	  in	  the	  2004	  election	  considers	  how	  religious	  beliefs	  shaped	  moral	  policy	  attitudes	  and	  how	  these	  policy	  preferences	  ultimately	  shaped	  presidential	  vote	  choice.	  His	  caveat	  is	  that	  when	  scholars	  attempt	  to	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interpret	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  outcomes	  as	  a	  function	  of	  presidential	  vote	  choice	  and	  vice	  versa,	  overall	  election	  outcomes	  become	  harder	  to	  interpret	  (Campbell	  2007).	  My	  analysis	  of	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  uses	  Campbell’s	  framework	  to	  isolate	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  and	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  electoral	  outcome	  in	  California.	  This	  interpretation	  will	  clarify	  the	  relationship	  between	  religious	  beliefs,	  political	  attitudes	  and	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  policymaking.	  Furthermore,	  this	  relationship	  can	  be	  extrapolated	  to	  interpret	  outcomes	  of	  other	  types	  of	  moral	  policymaking.	  	  
D. Religion,	  Politics	  and	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage	  in	  California	  
	   Proposition	  8,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  California	  Marriage	  Protection	  Act,	  “eliminates	  the	  right	  of	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  to	  marry”	  (California	  Voter	  Information	  Guide,	  2008).	  Passage	  of	  the	  initiative	  amended	  the	  California	  constitution	  and	  provided	  that	  “only	  marriage	  between	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman	  is	  valid	  or	  recognized	  in	  California”	  (California	  Voter	  Information	  Guide,	  2008).	  A	  “yes”	  vote	  on	  Proposition	  8	  was	  a	  vote	  in	  support	  of	  a	  ban	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  California.	  A	  “no”	  vote	  on	  Proposition	  8	  was	  a	  vote	  in	  support	  of	  keeping	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  legal	  in	  California.3	  The	  unique	  context	  of	  ballot	  initiatives	  and	  the	  California	  political	  scene	  contribute	  to	  Proposition	  8’s	  importance	  as	  a	  case	  study.	  	  California,	  known	  as	  a	  liberal	  “blue”	  state	  when	  Proposition	  8	  was	  first	  petitioned	  for	  the	  November	  2008	  ballot,	  seemed	  determined	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Same-­‐sex	  marriage	  became	  legal	  in	  California	  on	  June	  16,	  2008.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  California	  invalidated	  Proposition	  22	  (2000),	  the	  first	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  ban	  in	  California,	  based	  on	  an	  equal	  protection	  argument.	  Proposition	  8	  was	  thus	  a	  reaction	  to	  this	  court	  ruling.	  Proposition	  8	  was	  launched	  by	  the	  religious	  coalition,	  Protect	  Marriage,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  ban	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  California	  immediately	  following	  its	  legalization	  in	  June	  2008.	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to	  defeat	  the	  Proposition	  and	  uphold	  the	  June	  2008	  court	  decision	  legalizing	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  The	  state	  has	  historically	  leaned	  democratic	  and	  the	  major	  state	  newspapers,	  as	  important	  public	  opinion	  manipulators,	  have	  a	  liberal	  bias.	  However,	  California	  is	  not	  as	  whole-­‐heartedly	  liberal	  minded	  as	  conventional	  wisdom	  seems	  to	  espouse.	  The	  liberal	  areas	  of	  the	  state	  rest	  predominately	  in	  concentrated	  sections	  of	  northern	  and	  southern	  California	  clustered	  around	  Los	  Angeles	  and	  San	  Francisco	  (Figures	  3	  and	  4).	  The	  power	  and	  resolve	  of	  the	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  state	  to	  defeat	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  was	  significantly	  underestimated;	  these	  regions	  appeared	  too	  sparsely	  populated,	  and	  too	  spread	  out	  to	  be	  effectively	  mobilized	  before	  the	  Proposition	  8	  election.	  However,	  the	  strength	  of	  religious	  coalitions	  overrode	  this	  apparent	  weakness	  (Figures	  3	  and	  4).	  The	  California	  ban	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  was	  unexpected	  for	  many	  voters.	  More	  striking	  was	  not	  just	  that	  California	  was	  less	  liberal	  than	  expected,	  but	  that	  other	  states,	  like	  Iowa,	  could	  pass	  legislation	  legalizing	  same-­‐sex	  marriages.	  While	  Iowa	  is	  not	  a	  decisively	  conservative	  or	  liberal	  state,	  the	  Republican	  Party	  has	  made	  significant	  gains	  over	  the	  past	  several	  years	  and	  the	  state	  is	  home	  to	  many	  conservative	  Christians	  and	  Evangelicals	  (Des	  Moines	  Register	  2010).	  However,	  in	  2009,	  Iowa	  legalized	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  by	  a	  unanimous	  Iowa	  Supreme	  Court	  vote.	  Iowa’s	  state	  constitution	  cannot	  be	  amended	  by	  a	  simple	  vote	  of	  the	  people	  as	  in	  California;	  legislation	  must	  pass	  through	  both	  houses,	  making	  citizen	  initiatives	  much	  more	  complicated	  and	  the	  window	  for	  passage	  into	  law	  severely	  limited.	  Offering	  an	  interesting	  comparison	  with	  California,	  this	  provision	  of	  the	  Iowa	  state	  constitution	  constrains	  the	  scope	  of	  conflict	  in	  Iowa	  politics	  and	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  for	  interest	  group	  politics	  theory	  to	  prevail	  over	  morality	  politics	  theory	  (Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999).	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The	  outcome	  of	  Proposition	  8	  not	  only	  demonstrates	  a	  case	  where	  morality	  politics	  theory	  prevails,	  but	  also	  validates	  the	  concept	  of	  “political	  religion”	  as	  another	  advantage	  for	  religiously	  motivated	  campaigns.	  “Political	  Religion”	  is	  best	  understood	  in	  light	  of	  moral	  policymaking	  and	  describes	  the	  process	  in	  which	  religion	  exerts	  its	  most	  powerful	  political	  influence	  when	  moral	  policies	  are	  at	  stake,	  like	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  (Patrikios	  2008;	  Campbell	  2007;	  Layman	  2001).	  Thus,	  while	  there	  may	  be	  a	  bidirectional	  link	  between	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  political	  attitudes	  (i.e.,	  conservative	  or	  liberal),	  this	  link	  is	  most	  likely	  
indirect,	  and	  political	  attitudes	  are	  most	  reliably	  a	  function	  of	  religion	  when	  viewed	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  moral	  policymaking	  (Patrikios	  2008;	  Layman	  2001).	  An	  examination	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  religion	  on	  Proposition	  8	  voting	  behavior	  and	  campaign	  strategy	  suggest	  moral	  policy	  electoral	  outcomes	  fall	  in	  line	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  “political	  religion.”	  The	  Proposition	  8	  outcome	  connects	  religious	  belief	  with	  vote	  choice	  and	  a	  resulting	  ideological	  preference	  or	  attitude.	  By	  looking	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  religion	  and	  political	  ideology,	  my	  analysis	  will	  consider	  nuances	  in	  the	  path	  connecting	  religious	  beliefs,	  political	  ideology	  and	  moral	  attitudes	  (Figure	  5).	  Specific	  to	  Proposition	  8	  in	  California,	  my	  analysis	  will	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  campaign	  effects	  through	  time,	  particularly	  among	  the	  non-­‐religious,	  as	  another	  factor	  in	  this	  trajectory.	  	  Religious	  effects,	  campaign	  strategies,	  institutional	  structures	  of	  religious	  and	  nonreligious	  groups	  and	  state	  decision-­‐making	  apparatuses	  can	  be	  integrated	  to	  explain	  the	  magnified	  influence	  of	  religion	  preceding	  the	  Proposition	  8	  election	  and	  the	  role	  of	  political	  religion	  in	  deciding	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  policies.	  	   This	  paper	  examines	  the	  precarious	  space	  that	  religion	  occupies	  in	  the	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  debate	  in	  California.	  While	  existing	  literature	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  focuses	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  public	  opinion,	  social	  movements	  and	  political	  opportunity	  structure	  and	  the	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distinction	  between	  morality	  politics	  and	  interest	  groups	  politics,	  religion	  is	  often	  left	  out	  as	  a	  distinct	  type	  of	  social	  movement	  organization	  that	  functions	  according	  to	  unique	  rules	  and	  norms,	  specifically	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  morality	  politics	  (Soule	  2004;	  Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999).	  The	  broad	  literature	  on	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  morality	  legislation	  may	  perhaps	  encourage	  a	  search	  for	  other,	  non-­‐religious	  based	  explanations	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans.	  However,	  based	  on	  Layman’s	  trajectory	  (Figure	  5),	  religion	  cannot	  be	  easily	  extracted	  from	  moral	  policymaking.	  	  This	  paper	  considers	  non-­‐religious	  framework,	  such	  as	  public	  opinion,	  social	  movements	  and	  political	  opportunity	  structure,	  but	  places	  these	  factors	  in	  a	  religious	  context.	  	  Public	  opinion	  is	  examined	  in	  light	  of	  religious	  and	  non-­‐religious	  mobilization	  and	  rhetoric	  and	  media	  endorsements;	  social	  movements	  focus	  on	  religious	  groups	  and	  coalitions;	  and	  political	  opportunity	  structure	  analysis	  incorporates	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  process	  as	  a	  religion-­‐friendly	  institution.	  	  Aggregating	  the	  religious	  and	  non-­‐religious	  approaches	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  legislation	  will	  mirror	  Kenneth	  Wald’s	  analysis	  of	  Evangelical	  Protestant	  mobilization.	  Wald	  uses	  three	  non-­‐religious	  independent	  variables:	  (i)	  social	  influences,	  (ii)	  institutional	  influences	  and	  (iii)	  values,	  and	  considers	  how	  changes	  across	  these	  three	  parameters	  operate	  within	  Evangelical	  Protestant	  groups	  and	  produce	  change	  in	  Evangelical	  Protestant	  mobilization	  (Wald	  and	  Calhoun-­‐Brown	  2007).	  	  My	  analysis	  demonstrates	  how	  morally	  framed	  issues	  capitalize	  on	  deeply	  held	  values	  and	  preexisting	  religious	  beliefs	  to	  sustain	  and	  stabilize	  bases	  of	  support.	  By	  contrast,	  opposition	  groups	  depend	  on	  time-­‐sensitive	  campaign	  effects	  and	  strategies,	  such	  as	  elite	  endorsements,	  via	  both	  traditional	  media	  and	  new	  social	  media	  outlets	  (e.g.	  YouTube),	  to	  achieve	  their	  desired	  election	  results.	  Overall,	  I	  find	  that	  religious	  support	  for	  Proposition	  8	  remained	  relatively	  unchanged	  and	  strong	  in	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the	  months	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  election,	  while	  non-­‐religious	  opposition	  increased	  significantly	  only	  in	  October	  2008,	  the	  month	  before	  the	  election.	  The	  survey	  data	  used	  for	  this	  paper	  reveals	  that	  the	  religion	  effect	  was	  relatively	  limited	  until	  October	  2008,	  when	  it	  became	  the	  second	  most	  significant	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  predictor	  following	  political	  ideology	  orientation.	  The	  religion	  effect	  is	  thus	  most	  potent	  when	  combined	  with	  the	  effects	  of	  Proposition	  8	  campaigns.	  Furthermore,	  in	  California	  specifically,	  both	  the	  religion	  effect	  and	  campaign	  effect	  are	  magnified	  by	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  system’s	  inclination	  for	  moral	  policymaking.	  I	  expand	  on	  Donald	  Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Kenneth	  Meier’s	  previously	  described	  morality	  politics	  theory	  to	  conclude	  that	  ballot	  initiatives	  facilitate	  the	  enactment	  of	  legislation	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans.	  By	  contrast,	  when	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  legislation	  is	  introduced	  via	  discrete	  lobbying	  and	  sympathetic	  policymakers,	  legalization	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  becomes	  more	  likely.	  	  
	  
II. Theoretical	  Argument	  
	  
A. Argument	  and	  Hypotheses	  
	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  while	  DOMA	  increased	  the	  saliency	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans,	  it	  also	  questioned	  the	  traditional	  alignment	  between	  Democrats	  and	  liberal	  policymaking	  (i.e.	  pro	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  policies)	  and	  Republicans	  and	  conservative	  policymaking	  (i.e.	  anti	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  policies).	  DOMA	  was	  not	  a	  partisan	  piece	  of	  legislation	  and	  thus	  reinforces	  the	  notion	  that	  Democrats,	  more	  than	  Republicans,	  experience	  more	  cognitive	  dissonance	  in	  their	  ideological	  preferences	  and	  less	  opinion	  constraint;	  in	  some	  cases,	  their	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moral	  preferences	  are	  misaligned	  with	  their	  partisan	  affiliations	  (Baron	  2003;	  Campbell	  2007).	  Democratic	  President	  Bill	  Clinton	  signed	  DOMA	  into	  law,	  and	  its	  passage	  highlights	  the	  preeminence,	  and	  not	  the	  alignment,	  of	  religious	  and	  ideological	  affiliations	  over	  partisan	  affiliations	  in	  moral	  policy	  spheres.	  Democrats	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  allies	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  legalization	  efforts,	  while	  Republicans	  are	  expected	  to	  champion	  family	  values	  and	  morally	  grounded	  policies	  (Putnam	  and	  Campbell	  2010).	  Consistent	  with	  these	  alignments,	  Republicans	  introduced	  87	  percent	  of	  all	  state-­‐level	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  leaving	  the	  Democratic	  passage	  of	  DOMA	  in	  1996	  largely	  unexplained	  (Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999).	  Applying	  the	  logic	  of	  partisan-­‐ideology	  alignment,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  on	  a	  statewide	  level	  there	  will	  be	  a	  general	  congruence	  between	  state	  policy	  making	  and	  majority	  public	  opinion	  (Lax	  and	  Phillips	  2009).	  “State	  political	  structures	  appear	  to	  do	  a	  good	  job	  in	  delivering	  more	  liberal	  policies	  to	  more	  liberal	  states	  and	  more	  conservative	  policies	  to	  more	  conservative	  states.	  Across	  a	  range	  policies,	  public	  opinion	  counts”	  (Erikson,	  Wright	  and	  McIver;	  Hutcheson	  and	  Taylor	  1973).	  	  However,	  this	  assertion	  is	  not	  consistent	  with	  the	  case	  of	  Proposition	  8	  in	  California,	  an	  outcome	  that	  suggests,	  like	  DOMA,	  a	  partisan-­‐ideology	  misalignment.	  Jeffrey	  Lax	  and	  Justin	  Phillips	  put	  forth	  an	  alternative	  theory	  that	  explains	  the	  Proposition	  8	  exception.	  They	  stress	  that	  minority	  religious	  conservative	  groups	  are	  often	  powerful	  enough	  to	  block	  public	  opinion	  and	  disrupt	  policy	  congruence.	  This	  condition	  presents	  a	  different	  policymaking	  context	  where	  church	  strength,	  regardless	  of	  majority	  public	  opinion,	  has	  a	  “systematic	  relationship”	  with	  public	  policy	  (Fairbanks	  1977).	  In	  this	  environment,	  religiously	  orthodox	  denominations	  become	  influential	  subcultures	  in	  state	  politics	  (Fairbanks	  1977).	  Therefore,	  these	  traditionalist	  coalitions	  will	  have	  a	  powerful	  impact	  on	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policy	  (Campbell	  2007).	  Following	  this	  argument,	  religion	  will	  dictate	  stable	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  preferences	  among	  Christian	  voters	  across	  time,	  and	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign	  will	  benefit	  from	  the	  strong	  religious	  institutions	  and	  religious	  beliefs	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  these	  consistent	  voting	  preferences.	  	  	  	   In	  light	  of	  the	  narrow	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign	  victory,	  I	  expect	  that	  support	  for	  Proposition	  8	  among	  Christian	  individuals	  will	  remain	  strong	  prior	  to	  the	  election	  as	  a	  result	  of	  internal	  institutional	  strengths	  and	  favorable	  external	  electoral	  conditions.	  Religion	  creates	  stable	  moral	  beliefs	  that	  predict	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  and	  ultimately	  expose	  ideological	  preferences	  among	  Christian	  voters.	  My	  first	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  the	  religion	  effect	  primes	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  and	  creates	  stable	  ideological	  preferences	  in	  favor	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  among	  Christian	  voters.	  Conversely,	  the	  religion	  effect	  combines	  with	  campaign	  effects	  to	  produce	  a	  change	  in	  non-­‐Christian	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  over	  time.	  As	  campaign	  effects	  become	  stronger	  between	  August	  2008	  and	  October	  2008	  and	  combine	  with	  elite	  and	  media	  manipulated	  public	  opinion,	  the	  religion	  effect	  is	  most	  powerful	  for	  non-­‐Christian	  voters	  and	  predicts	  increased	  non-­‐Christian	  opposition	  to	  Proposition	  8	  over	  time	  (H1).	  	  A	  regression	  analysis	  of	  2008	  election	  survey	  data	  will	  provide	  insights	  for	  this	  claim.	  	  	   According	  to	  a	  Public	  Policy	  Institute	  of	  California	  (PPIC)	  study	  published	  in	  December	  2008,	  Californians	  and	  Their	  Government	  (2008),	  Californians	  generally	  believe	  that	  policies	  decided	  by	  ballot	  initiatives	  are	  preferable	  to	  those	  decided	  by	  the	  governor	  or	  the	  state	  legislature.	  However,	  there	  was	  also	  wide	  agreement	  that	  the	  voter	  initiative	  system	  should	  be	  changed	  to	  make	  initiative	  wording	  less	  complex	  and	  confusing	  and	  more	  accessible	  to	  the	  average	  voter.	  A	  majority	  of	  Californians	  said	  they	  would	  agree	  to	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implement	  measures	  that	  would	  demand	  that	  the	  state	  legislature	  and	  initiative	  sponsors	  attempt	  to	  reach	  a	  compromise	  before	  an	  initiative	  was	  officially	  placed	  on	  the	  ballot.	  In	  this	  survey,	  California	  Republicans	  and	  Independents	  disproportionately	  favored	  the	  initiative	  process	  compared	  with	  their	  Democratic	  counterparts,	  a	  finding	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  morality	  politics	  theory	  (Californians	  and	  Their	  Government	  2008;	  Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999).	  If	  ballot	  initiatives,	  regardless	  of	  moral	  content,	  are	  more	  prone	  to	  satisfy	  Republican	  and	  Independent	  voters,	  their	  effect	  will	  be	  magnified	  when	  there	  is	  a	  simultaneous	  appeal	  to	  moral	  values.	  Finally,	  because	  moral	  issues	  require	  less	  cognitive	  engagement	  and	  voter	  involvement,	  voters	  with	  deeply	  held	  religious	  beliefs	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  deterred	  by	  complex	  wording,	  further	  enhancing	  the	  morally	  conservative	  position.	  	  Not	  only	  was	  the	  outcome	  of	  Proposition	  8	  a	  product	  of	  religious	  and	  non-­‐religious	  mobilization	  and	  campaign	  effects,	  but	  it	  was	  also	  the	  product	  of	  California’s	  electoral	  structure.	  My	  second	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  California’s	  ballot	  initiative	  system	  favors	  policies	  grounded	  in	  deeply	  rooted	  religious	  values;	  government	  by	  initiative	  supports	  morality	  politics	  theory,	  rather	  than	  the	  more	  rational	  interest	  group	  theory.	  Voter	  behavior	  is	  derived	  not	  only	  from	  religion	  and	  timely	  campaign	  effects	  but	  it	  is	  also	  dependent	  upon	  state	  institutions	  and	  the	  policymaking	  norms	  associated	  with	  them	  (H2).	  	  	   The	  paper	  will	  proceed	  as	  follows:	  First,	  religious	  groups	  mobilized	  for	  Proposition	  8	  will	  be	  contrasted	  with	  non-­‐religious	  groups	  opposed	  to	  Proposition	  8	  in	  terms	  of	  morality	  and	  interest	  group	  politics	  theory.	  	  There	  will	  be	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  how	  religious	  groups	  in	  favor	  of	  Proposition	  8	  function	  internally	  as	  organizations	  and	  externally	  as	  important	  actors	  in	  social	  movements	  and	  architects	  of	  public	  opinion.	  These	  behaviors	  will	  be	  compared	  with	  the	  campaign	  tactics	  and	  mobilization	  efforts	  of	  non-­‐
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Christian	  groups	  opposed	  to	  Proposition	  8.	  Next,	  an	  alternate	  interpretation	  of	  political	  opportunity	  structure	  will	  provide	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  my	  second	  hypothesis.	  A	  movement	  bolstered	  by	  elite	  allies	  and	  innovative	  campaign	  tactics	  appeared	  to	  many	  as	  strong	  mobilization	  against	  Proposition	  8.	  By	  aggregating	  morality	  politics	  theory	  and	  the	  conservative	  tendency	  to	  support	  ballot	  initiatives	  over	  legislative	  and	  judicial	  policymaking,	  I	  will	  explain	  the	  actual	  election	  results.	  Finally,	  there	  will	  be	  an	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  voter	  data	  from	  the	  three	  months	  preceding	  the	  November	  2008	  election.	  I	  use	  regression	  analysis	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  isolated	  effect	  of	  religion	  over	  the	  three	  time	  waves	  and	  to	  highlight	  other	  important	  demographic	  and	  ideological	  influences	  on	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice.	  	  
	  
B. Waging	  a	  Moral	  Policy	  Campaign;	  Morality	  Politics	  Theory	  vs.	  Interest	  
Group	  Politics	  Theory	  	  
	  
	   Religious	  groups	  have	  been	  avid	  supporters	  of	  morally	  grounded	  policies	  for	  over	  half	  a	  century.	  	  Regardless	  of	  denomination,	  the	  more	  religiously	  orthodox	  hold	  more	  morally	  conservative	  and	  ultimately	  more	  discriminatory	  views	  towards	  minorities,	  like	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  individuals	  (Finkel	  2001).	  In	  particular,	  the	  1980’s	  presented	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  for	  religious	  fundamentalism	  and	  politics.	  After	  a	  decade	  of	  pivotal	  court	  decisions	  on	  public	  school	  prayer	  and	  abortion,	  the	  Evangelical	  religious-­‐political	  institution	  known	  as	  the	  Religious	  Right	  sprouted	  from	  a	  disgruntled	  and	  economically	  weakened	  nation.	  The	  Religious	  Right	  assumed	  a	  heavily	  partisan	  character,	  acting	  both	  as	  a	  lifeline	  and	  identity	  building	  tool	  for	  the	  struggling	  Republican	  Party	  and	  the	  American	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Conservative	  movement	  (Micklethwait	  and	  Wooldridge	  2009).	  The	  Religious	  Right	  provided	  another	  avenue	  for	  Conservatives	  to	  maintain	  a	  following.	  	  This	  coalition	  capitalized	  on	  the	  discriminatory	  attitudes	  of	  fundamentalist	  religious	  groups	  (Finkel	  2001).	  	   The	  Religious	  Right	  became	  further	  politicized	  by	  actively	  championing	  moral	  policies	  and	  legislation.	  The	  movement’s	  prominence	  in	  policymaking	  and	  lobbying	  has	  strengthened	  the	  link	  between	  religion	  and	  partisanship,	  and	  reinforced	  the	  Republican	  Party’s	  proclivity	  toward	  moral	  conservatism.	  	  The	  politics	  of	  morality	  differs	  significantly	  from	  other	  policymaking	  trends	  and	  is	  defined	  by	  a	  unique	  set	  of	  characteristics.	  Moral	  policies	  are	  effectively	  a	  legal	  sanction	  of	  what	  is	  right	  or	  wrong	  and	  what	  society	  chooses	  to	  validate	  as	  a	  set	  of	  both	  basic	  and	  important	  values.	  Furthermore,	  moral	  policies	  define	  and	  simultaneously	  alienate	  one	  or	  more	  minority	  groups.	  With	  any	  moral	  policy,	  at	  least	  one	  minority	  group	  will	  conflict	  with	  the	  agreed	  upon	  “value”	  at	  stake	  (Mooney	  1999).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Proposition	  8,	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  community	  constituted	  that	  minority.	  The	  policy	  outcomes	  of	  moral	  ballot	  initiatives	  or	  legislation	  disclose	  “potent	  symbols	  of	  what	  a	  polity	  believes	  and	  stands	  for”	  (Edelman,	  1964;	  Mooney	  1999	  pg.	  675).	  	  Protest-­‐style	  social	  movements	  and	  religious	  groups	  dominate	  mobilization	  for	  moral	  policies	  (Thorson	  et	  al.	  2010).	  These	  advocacy	  groups	  set	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  debate:	  they	  classify	  a	  value	  or	  principle	  as	  either	  a	  sin	  or	  moral	  virtue	  and	  then	  demand	  that	  society	  chose	  which	  value	  to	  validate	  (Mooney	  1999).	  Faith-­‐based	  groups	  are	  usually	  favored	  because	  the	  general	  population	  absorbs	  moral	  issues	  more	  easily	  than	  other	  types	  of	  policies.	  People’s	  attitudes	  concerning	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  are	  generally	  more	  absolute	  and	  straightforward	  than	  their	  attitudes	  towards	  a	  change	  in	  state	  property	  taxes	  (Mooney	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1999).	  While	  individuals	  may	  be	  significantly	  affected	  by	  an	  increase	  or	  decrease	  in	  property	  taxes,	  this	  type	  of	  voting	  decision	  requires	  more	  voter	  education	  relative	  to	  moral	  policy	  issues,	  and	  thus	  citizens	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  engage	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  debate.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  because	  moral	  policies	  touch	  on	  deeply	  held	  principles	  and	  values	  that	  strike	  religious	  chords	  and	  often	  echo	  biblical	  commands,	  individuals	  require	  less	  external	  information	  to	  choose	  sides	  and	  they	  are	  thus	  more	  likely	  to	  become	  involved,	  and	  at	  a	  minimum,	  vote	  (www.biblegateway.com).	  In	  sum,	  moral	  policy	  debates	  draw	  high	  participation	  and	  provide	  a	  more	  dynamic	  set	  of	  variables	  and	  characteristics	  that	  contribute	  to	  final	  policy	  outcomes.	  However,	  moral	  policymaking	  is	  complicated	  because	  there	  is	  essentially	  no	  mechanism	  for	  compromise.	  People	  align	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  debate	  and	  there	  is	  rarely	  room	  for	  effective	  negotiation;	  deeply	  held	  values	  are	  often	  most	  difficult	  to	  let	  go	  of.	  Morality	  politics	  theory	  predicts	  that	  ballot	  propositions,	  such	  as	  Proposition	  8,	  ignite	  a	  high	  level	  of	  citizen	  participation,	  and	  religious	  groups	  that	  champion	  moral	  values	  will	  be	  most	  vocal,	  passionate	  and	  involved	  in	  the	  campaign	  and	  will	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  electoral	  outcome.	  Morality	  politics	  theory	  also	  suggests	  that	  because	  Proposition	  8	  was	  a	  ballot	  initiative,	  not	  a	  piece	  of	  legislation	  introduced	  by	  lobbyists	  in	  Sacramento,	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  would	  be	  disadvantaged	  and	  less	  adept	  at	  stabilizing	  support.	  Finally,	  moral	  policymaking	  creates	  conditions	  that	  trigger	  high	  levels	  of	  support	  from	  religious	  organizations	  and	  make	  religion	  a	  more	  salient	  indicator	  of	  vote	  choice	  (Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999).	  These	  vote	  preferences	  can	  be	  successfully	  embedded	  in	  and	  justified	  by	  previously	  held	  religious	  beliefs.	  Moral	  policy	  campaigns	  are	  successful	  in	  ballot	  initiative	  contexts	  because	  they	  can	  effectively	  capitalize	  on	  pre-­‐existing	  religious	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groups	  and	  create	  new	  coalitions	  grounded	  in	  a	  broader	  faith	  context	  based	  on	  religious	  traditionalism.	  These	  trends	  are	  particularly	  prevalent	  in	  California	  and	  explain	  why	  religion	  is	  an	  important	  indicator	  of	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  and	  election	  outcome.	  In	  light	  of	  morality	  politics	  theory,	  religious	  groups	  and	  coalitions	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  wage	  a	  successful	  Proposition	  8	  campaign	  because	  of	  the	  biases	  of	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  system	  and	  institutional	  and	  behavioral	  advantages	  of	  religious	  organizations.	  	  	  
C. Religious	  Coalitions	  and	  Political	  Religion;	  Religious	  Group	  Behavior	  	  
	   The	  interest	  groups	  and	  social	  movements	  that	  dominate	  campaign	  discourse	  shed	  light	  on	  electoral	  outcomes	  and	  voting	  behavior	  (Soule	  2004;	  Wald	  and	  Calhoun-­‐Brown	  2007).	  The	  religious	  groups	  and	  social	  movements	  that	  mobilized	  in	  favor	  of	  Proposition	  8	  bridged	  denominational	  gaps	  and	  created	  a	  strong	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  religious	  force	  for	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign.	  While	  the	  most	  notable	  donors	  to	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign	  were	  members	  of	  the	  Mormon	  Church	  and	  members	  of	  religiously	  oriented	  family	  values	  organizations,	  support	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  these	  pre-­‐existing	  groups.	  Proposition	  8	  built	  new	  coalitions	  grounded	  in	  religious	  ideology	  and	  faith-­‐based	  politics.	  These	  coalitions	  support	  David	  E.	  Campbell	  and	  Geoffrey	  Layman’s	  concept	  of	  linkages	  between	  the	  religiously	  orthodox,	  not	  
within	  religious	  denominations.	  The	  presence	  and	  unparalleled	  strength	  of	  these	  coalitions	  amplified	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  relationship	  between	  church	  strength	  and	  state	  public	  policies	  (Fairbanks	  1977).	  According	  to	  Schubert	  and	  Flint	  Public	  Affairs,	  the	  public	  relations	  firm	  behind	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign,	  “Members	  of	  the	  Mormon	  faith	  played	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  coalition,	  but	  they	  were	  only	  a	  part	  of	  our	  winning	  coalition.	  We	  had	  the	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support	  of	  virtually	  the	  entire	  faith	  community	  in	  California.	  Prop.	  8	  didn’t	  win	  because	  of	  the	  Mormons.	  It	  won	  because…we	  built	  a	  diverse	  coalition;	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  because	  we	  activated	  that	  coalition	  at	  the	  grassroots	  level”	  (Politics	  Magazine	  2009).	  Schubert	  and	  Flint’s	  winning	  coalition	  was	  denominationally	  diverse,	  and	  thus	  gained	  strength	  from	  its	  commitment	  to	  religious	  traditionalism.	  As	  an	  extension	  of	  Layman’s	  model	  (Figure	  5),	  religious	  behavior	  is	  increasingly	  linked	  with	  ideological	  and	  partisan	  preferences	  (Patrikios	  2008).	  	  Stratos	  Patrikios	  describes	  a	  bidirectional	  causal	  relationship	  between	  religious	  behavior	  and	  ideology.	  Ideology	  has	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  religious	  behavior;	  likewise,	  religious	  behavior	  (i.e.	  church	  attendance	  and	  religious	  traditionalism)	  reinforces	  partisan	  and	  ideological	  preferences.	  In	  particular,	  religious	  behavior	  becomes	  more	  predictive	  of	  political	  behavior	  when	  salient	  ideological	  preferences	  or	  moral	  decision-­‐making	  infuses	  religious	  organizations.	  Same-­‐sex	  marriage	  is	  an	  important	  issue	  for	  religious	  voters.	  Thus,	  ideological	  preferences	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  reinforce	  religious	  behavior,	  while	  religious	  behavior	  reinforces	  ideological	  preferences	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  policymaking.	  	  According	  to	  Patrikios,	  “the	  politically	  charged	  American	  religious	  landscape…can	  lead	  individuals	  to	  react	  by	  altering	  their	  religious	  behavior”	  (Patrikios	  2008,	  p.	  369).	  Patrikios	  coins	  the	  concept	  of	  “political	  religion”	  and	  asserts	  that	  the	  politicization	  of	  religious	  organizations	  is	  a	  growing	  trend.	  Ideology	  profoundly	  shapes	  behavior	  within	  religious	  groups	  via	  politicized	  moral	  issues.	  This	  link	  is	  becoming	  institutionalized	  to	  the	  point	  where	  churches	  are	  increasingly	  politically	  homogeneous;	  dissenting	  church	  members	  remove	  themselves	  from	  their	  religious	  organizations	  as	  ideological	  and	  religious	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behaviors	  become	  increasingly	  intertwined	  and	  aligned.	  As	  dissenters	  leave,	  religious	  organizations	  become	  more	  homogeneous	  and	  ideological	  preferences	  congeal	  around	  morally	  compelling	  issues.	  If	  ideology	  sustains	  religious	  coalitions	  despite	  denominational	  differences,	  then	  the	  religion	  effect	  on	  voter	  behavior	  is	  in	  fact	  an	  indirect	  product	  of	  homogeneous	  political	  ideologies	  that	  operate	  within	  faith-­‐based	  organizations	  (Patrikios	  2008;	  Layman	  2001).	  	  	  	   Faith-­‐based	  organizations	  capitalize	  on	  these	  ideological	  (and	  as	  a	  result	  partisan)	  similarities	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  Faith-­‐based	  organizations,	  like	  churches,	  can	  be	  politically	  effective	  through	  the	  practice	  of	  “political	  religion”	  and	  because	  they	  are	  formal	  social	  movements	  with	  strong	  organizational	  capacities.	  Not	  only	  are	  political	  preferences	  easily	  reinforced	  within	  these	  organizations,	  but	  also,	  churches	  have	  a	  clearly	  defined	  infrastructure	  and	  well-­‐treaded	  institutional	  channels	  for	  decision-­‐making	  (Andrews	  2001).	  	  Church	  group	  behavior	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  analogous	  to	  that	  of	  interest	  groups;	  both	  exhibit	  the	  same	  type	  of	  political	  influence	  and	  policymaking	  intent	  and	  both	  abide	  by	  institutionalized	  rules	  and	  norms.	  Religious	  organizations	  constitute	  a	  potent	  combination	  of	  homogeneous	  moral	  beliefs	  and	  partisan	  ideology,	  and	  institutional	  strength,	  and,	  as	  such,	  are	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  study	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  individuals	  and	  their	  religiously	  motivated	  voting	  behavior.	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D. Non-­‐Christian	  Mobilization	  against	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage	  Bans:	  Elite	  Allies,	  
Media	  Endorsements,	  YouTube	  and	  Campaign	  Effects	  
	   	  While	  opponents	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  would	  have	  benefitted	  if	  California	  electoral	  institutions	  favored	  interest	  group	  politics	  theory,	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  could	  not	  capitalize	  on	  morality	  politics	  theory	  as	  effectively	  as	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign.	  Furthermore,	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  did	  not	  possess	  the	  same	  homogeneity	  of	  beliefs	  as	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  religious	  coalition.	  Even	  though	  both	  coalitions	  included	  a	  range	  of	  groups,	  the	  coalition	  of	  the	  religious	  had	  more	  common	  ground	  than	  the	  coalition	  of	  the	  non-­‐religious	  (Campbell	  2007).	  Thus,	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  relied	  on	  different	  appeals	  to	  attract	  support;	  it	  had	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  mitigate	  the	  dramatic	  effects	  of	  mass-­‐based	  religious	  and	  moral	  appeals.	  	  	   This	  paper	  juxtaposes	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign’s	  apparent	  lack	  of	  a	  religious	  basis	  with	  Campbell’s	  notion	  of	  a	  “religious	  left”	  and	  the	  results	  of	  my	  regression	  analysis,	  which	  suggest	  that	  religious	  affiliation	  predicts	  non-­‐religious	  opposition	  to	  Proposition	  8	  over	  time.	  To	  offset	  disadvantages	  posed	  by	  morality	  politics,	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  found	  an	  alternative	  way	  to	  morally	  implicate	  voters.	  It	  argued	  that	  voting	  for	  Proposition	  8	  was	  a	  vote	  for	  the	  oppression	  of	  equal	  human	  rights,	  while	  a	  vote	  against	  Proposition	  8	  embraced	  equality	  and	  freedom	  for	  all	  (Thorson	  et	  al.	  2010,	  Perry	  v.	  Schwarzenegger	  2010).	  Although	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  did	  not	  capitalize	  on	  this	  appeal	  to	  its	  fullest	  extent,	  it	  did	  popularize	  a	  new,	  groundbreaking	  type	  of	  political	  campaigning	  and	  mobilization	  by	  fundamentally	  changing	  the	  way	  YouTube	  and	  social	  media	  could	  be	  utilized	  as	  a	  political	  tool	  and	  campaign	  platform.	  Furthermore,	  the	  campaign	  was	  strengthened	  by	  endorsements	  from	  well-­‐known	  media	  outlets,	  large,	  influential	  tech	  companies	  like	  Google	  and	  Apple,	  political	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elites	  and	  popular	  celebrities.	  These	  endorsements	  bolstered	  public	  opinion	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign,	  increased	  the	  salience	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  as	  a	  basic,	  constitutionally	  guaranteed	  human	  right	  and	  acted	  as	  a	  counterweight	  to	  the	  strong	  institutions	  and	  coalitions	  of	  the	  Religious	  Right.	  	  	   The	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  endorsed	  a	  “no”	  vote	  on	  Proposition	  8	  on	  August	  8,	  2008,	  just	  prior	  to	  the	  first	  Public	  Policy	  Institute	  of	  California	  (PPIC)	  survey	  used	  in	  my	  analysis.	  Their	  endorsement	  declared	  that	  “by	  banning	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  Proposition	  8	  would	  create	  second	  class	  citizens”	  and	  stated	  that	  the	  California	  Supreme	  Court	  had	  “ruled	  that	  marriage	  was	  a	  fundamental	  right	  under	  the	  state	  constitution.	  As	  such	  it	  should	  not	  be	  denied	  to…gay	  and	  lesbian	  couples.”	  The	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  countered	  religious	  arguments	  for	  Proposition	  8,	  expressing	  their	  hope	  “that	  voters	  whatever	  their	  personal	  or	  religious	  convictions	  [would]	  shudder	  and	  vote	  no	  on	  Proposition	  8”	  (Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  August	  8,	  2008).	  	  	  In	  September,	  The	  San	  Diego	  Union	  Tribune	  adopted	  the	  same	  view,	  asserting,	  “Gay	  and	  lesbian	  couples	  deserve	  the	  same	  dignity	  and	  respect	  in	  marriage	  that	  heterosexual	  couples	  have	  long	  enjoyed.”	  The	  San	  Diego	  Union	  Tribune	  specifically	  refuted	  points	  made	  by	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign;	  their	  endorsement	  countered	  that,	  “debate	  about	  child	  rearing	  is	  entirely	  beside	  the	  point,	  because	  Proposition	  8	  is	  about	  marriage	  only”	  (San	  Diego	  Union	  Tribune,	  September	  18,	  2008).	  	  	  The	  San	  Francisco	  Chronicle	  endorsed	  a	  “no”	  vote	  in	  October.	  The	  Chronicle	  cited	  the	  California	  state	  constitution,	  stating	  that	  it	  is	  a	  “fundamental	  constitutional	  right	  to	  form	  a	  family	  relationship.”	  Singling	  out	  a	  group	  was	  thus	  an	  “ugly	  distortion	  of	  the	  very	  purpose	  of	  a	  constitution”	  (San	  Francisco	  Chronicle,	  October	  1,	  2008).	  The	  New	  York	  Times	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recommended	  a	  “no”	  vote	  in	  September.	  Their	  endorsement	  applauded	  the	  June	  2008	  overturning	  of	  Proposition	  22	  (2000)	  and	  declared,	  “it	  is	  our	  fervent	  hope	  that	  Californians	  will	  reject	  this	  mean	  spirited	  attempt	  to	  embed	  second	  class	  treatment	  of	  one	  group	  of	  citizens	  in	  the	  state	  constitution”	  (New	  York	  Times,	  September	  28,	  2008).	  	   As	  a	  policy,	  Google	  prefers	  not	  to	  make	  political	  statements;	  however,	  in	  September	  2008,	  Sergey	  Brin,	  co-­‐founder	  and	  President	  of	  Technology,	  wrote	  on	  the	  Official	  Google	  Blog:	  “it	  is	  the	  chilling	  and	  discriminatory	  effect	  of	  the	  proposition	  on	  many	  of	  our	  employees	  that	  brings	  Google	  to	  publicly	  oppose	  Proposition	  8…we	  see	  this	  fundamentally	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  equality”	  (The	  Official	  Google	  Blog,	  September	  26,	  2008).	  In	  October	  2008,	  Apple	  posted	  on	  CNet	  news	  that	  “a	  person’s	  fundamental	  rights	  should	  not	  be	  affected	  by	  their	  sexual	  orientation”	  and	  pledged	  to	  contribute	  $100,000	  to	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  (CNet	  News,	  October	  24,	  2008).	  	  	   Political	  elites	  like	  Senators	  Barbara	  Boxer	  and	  Diane	  Feinstein	  (D-­‐CA)	  also	  supported	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign.	  Unexpectedly,	  Republican	  governor	  Arnold	  Schwarzenegger,	  who	  previously	  supported	  Proposition	  22	  (a	  ballot	  initiative	  that	  banned	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  California	  in	  2000)	  and	  had	  vetoed	  two	  separate	  marriage	  equality	  bills	  in	  California	  (2005	  and	  2007)	  because	  he	  claimed	  to	  be	  in	  favor	  of	  “the	  will	  of	  the	  people,”	  shifted	  his	  position	  and	  endorsed	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  2008,	  when	  Proposition	  22	  was	  still	  making	  its	  way	  through	  the	  courts,	  Governor	  Schwarzenegger	  told	  the	  Log	  Cabin	  Republicans,	  a	  Republican	  group	  in	  favor	  of	  gay	  marriage,	  that	  he	  “[would]	  always	  be	  there	  to	  fight	  against	  [same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans]”	  (Huffington	  Post	  April	  19,	  2008).	  	  This	  strong	  elite	  consensus	  created	  a	  space	  for	  non-­‐Christian	  voters	  to	  adjust	  and	  crystallize	  their	  views.	  Political	  elites	  provide	  powerful	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informative	  cues	  from	  which	  ordinary	  citizens	  can	  glean	  their	  own	  policy	  preferences	  and	  justify	  their	  vote	  choices	  (Zaller	  1992).	  	  	   Brad	  Pitt,	  Steven	  Spielberg	  and	  Tom	  Hanks	  were	  just	  a	  few	  of	  the	  prominent	  celebrities	  who	  publicly	  supported	  and	  made	  significant	  contributions	  to	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign.	  Like	  political	  elites,	  celebrities	  are	  powerful	  influencers	  of	  public	  opinion.	  They	  expose	  ordinary	  citizens	  to	  their	  opinions	  via	  highly	  publicized	  messages	  and	  campaign	  dollars.	  Through	  these	  means,	  celebrities	  become	  a	  source	  of	  voter	  education	  and	  leaders	  of	  voter	  awareness	  and	  involvement	  (Zaller	  1992).	  Celebrities	  engaged	  voters,	  improved	  No	  on	  8	  mobilization	  and	  ultimately	  induced	  a	  reverse	  religion	  effect	  against	  Proposition	  8.	  Their	  influential	  celebrity	  status	  was	  well	  suited	  to	  successfully	  manipulate	  the	  fluid	  and	  unstable	  opinions	  of	  non-­‐Christian	  voters	  in	  California.	  These	  voters	  rejected	  religious	  messages	  and	  rationalized	  their	  preferences	  through	  the	  political	  discourse	  of	  these	  entertainment	  elites.	  Entertainment	  elites,	  political	  elites	  and	  media	  outlets	  countered	  the	  message	  of	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign	  for	  non-­‐Christian	  voters.	  As	  leaders	  of	  public	  opinion,	  they	  disputed	  and	  rejected	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign	  rhetoric	  and	  created	  instead	  an	  a-­‐religious	  narrative	  for	  non-­‐Christian	  voters,	  grounded	  in	  appeals	  to	  constitutionality	  and	  universal	  equal	  rights.	  Elite	  messages	  made	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  a	  salient	  political	  issue	  for	  non-­‐Christian	  voters	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  religious	  beliefs	  made	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  a	  salient	  political	  issue	  for	  Christian	  voters,	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  high	  importance	  of	  Proposition	  8	  outcome	  for	  non-­‐Christian	  versus	  Christian	  voters.	  Christian	  voters	  maintained	  stable	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  preferences	  over	  time,	  and	  they	  tended	  to	  rank	  the	  importance	  of	  Proposition	  8	  lower	  than	  non-­‐Christian	  voters.	  As	  non-­‐Christian	  voters	  increased	  their	  support	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  their	  perception	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Proposition	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seemed	  to	  grow,	  further	  contributing	  to	  the	  narrowing	  space	  between	  “yes”	  and	  “no”	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice.	  	   The	  No	  on	  8	  campaign’s	  use	  of	  social	  media	  highlights	  how	  the	  use	  of	  an	  alternative	  campaign	  platform	  can	  both	  aid	  and	  hinder	  a	  ballot	  initiative	  campaign.	  The	  YouTube	  campaign	  reinforced	  and	  complemented	  elite	  endorsements;	  however,	  the	  campaign	  also	  serves	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  strategy	  that	  was	  not	  well	  suited	  for	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  electoral	  context.	  The	  No	  on	  8	  YouTube	  campaign	  disseminated	  content	  that	  closely	  resembled	  and	  emulated	  protest	  movement	  qualities,	  rather	  than	  follow	  organized	  interest	  group	  and	  social	  movement	  protocols.	  However,	  YouTube	  differentiated	  itself	  from	  protests	  because	  it	  could	  unite	  geographically	  dispersed	  individuals	  and	  promote	  solidarity	  amongst	  Proposition	  8	  opposition	  (Thorson	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  In	  Thorson	  et	  al’s	  analysis	  of	  YouTube	  and	  the	  Proposition	  8	  campaign,	  75.3%	  of	  the	  Proposition	  8	  videos	  were	  disseminated	  by	  No	  on	  8	  supporters,	  while	  only	  10.5%	  were	  for	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign	  and	  14.2%	  were	  informational	  and	  espoused	  no	  stance.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  videos	  were	  disproportionately	  created	  by	  professional	  filmmakers,	  compared	  with	  the	  No	  on	  8	  “homegrown”	  videos	  (Thorson	  et	  al.	  2010).	  This	  finding	  further	  supports	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign’s	  institutional	  and	  organizational	  advantage.	  	  	   Although	  YouTube	  videos	  were	  used	  as	  a	  campaign	  tactic	  by	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Proposition	  8	  campaign,	  most	  of	  the	  videos	  posted	  were	  resoundingly	  opposed	  to	  Proposition	  8.	  To	  assess	  the	  full	  effect	  of	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  and	  interpret	  non-­‐Christian	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice,	  the	  YouTube	  campaign	  must	  be	  combined	  with	  the	  influences	  of	  political,	  entertainment	  and	  media	  elite	  messages.	  YouTube	  viewership	  is	  both	  self-­‐selecting	  and	  skewed	  towards	  a	  younger	  demographic,	  including	  those	  ineligible	  to	  actually	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vote;	  thus,	  the	  campaign	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  other	  platforms	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  voters	  (Thorson	  et	  al	  2010).	  The	  YouTube	  campaign	  lacked	  the	  mass	  dissemination,	  strategy	  and	  organization	  of	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign;	  it	  relied	  on	  elite	  messages	  and	  user	  generated	  YouTube	  content,	  instead	  of	  creating	  a	  coherent,	  controlled	  narrative	  for	  the	  campaign.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  capitalize	  on	  new	  social	  media,	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  created	  forceful	  and	  compelling	  content,	  but	  lacked	  a	  coherent	  narrative	  to	  ensure	  a	  winning	  strategy.	  	  Exposure	  to	  online	  political	  content	  must	  be	  sought,	  and	  generally,	  those	  who	  choose	  to	  be	  exposed	  are	  already	  interested	  in	  the	  issue	  and	  come	  with	  a	  previously	  formulated	  opinion.	  While	  individual	  voters	  have	  to	  choose	  to	  go	  to	  a	  website	  or	  click	  on	  a	  YouTube	  video,	  they	  do	  not	  choose	  what	  commercial	  appears	  on	  their	  television	  screen,	  what	  letters	  are	  delivered	  to	  their	  mailbox	  or	  who	  calls	  their	  phone.	  Thus,	  the	  YouTube	  audiences	  were	  self-­‐selecting;	  the	  content	  targeted	  voters	  who	  already	  supported	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  and	  not	  potential	  supporters	  in	  need	  of	  more	  information	  and	  prompting.	  	  	   Despite	  these	  weaknesses,	  the	  YouTube	  campaign	  helps	  explain	  why	  non-­‐Christian	  Proposition	  8	  opposition	  increased	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  religion	  closer	  to	  the	  election.	  Thorson	  et	  al’s	  study	  explains	  that	  even	  though	  there	  were	  more	  No	  on	  8	  videos	  than	  Yes	  on	  8	  videos	  posted,	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  videos	  had	  more	  viewers.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  videos	  had	  overall	  lower	  average	  ratings	  than	  No	  on	  8	  videos.	  Two	  insights,	  according	  to	  Thorson	  et	  al’s	  study,	  can	  explain	  this	  phenomenon.	  The	  sheer	  number	  of	  videos	  available	  diluted	  the	  viewership	  data	  for	  the	  No	  on	  8	  videos,	  resulting	  in	  fewer	  viewings	  for	  each	  unique	  No	  on	  8	  video.	  Furthermore,	  many	  No	  on	  8	  supporters	  watched	  Yes	  on	  8	  videos,	  while	  Yes	  on	  8	  supporters	  did	  not	  watch	  No	  on	  8	  videos	  to	  the	  same	  extent.	  The	  No	  on	  8	  supporters	  are	  therefore	  responsible	  low	  average	  ratings	  of	  Yes	  on	  8	  videos.	  This	  viewership	  data	  suggests	  that	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because	  No	  on	  8	  supporters	  watched	  Yes	  on	  8	  videos,	  many	  of	  which	  used	  religious	  appeals,	  the	  religion	  factor	  had	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  opponents	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans.	  	  	   Ultimately,	  the	  YouTube	  campaign	  was	  an	  informal	  social	  movement	  organization	  with	  a	  limited	  capacity	  to	  access	  lobbyists	  and	  influence	  policymaking	  and	  policy	  change	  (Andrews	  2001;	  Zaller	  1992).	  This	  type	  of	  campaign	  method	  echoes	  David	  E.	  Campbell’s	  characterization	  of	  the	  “religious	  left”	  discussed	  above.	  The	  “religious	  left”	  coalition	  of	  the	  unaffiliated	  and	  less	  devotional	  is	  wrought	  with	  internal	  contradictions	  and	  thus	  has	  more	  difficulty	  formalizing	  its	  political	  presence.	  Furthermore,	  the	  “action-­‐reaction”	  model	  holds	  that	  activities	  of	  social	  movement	  organizations,	  such	  as	  protests,	  are	  disruptive	  and	  threatening	  to	  elites;	  these	  movements	  may	  raise	  awareness	  and	  support	  for	  their	  cause,	  but	  ultimately	  hinder	  the	  implementation	  of	  tangible	  policy	  decisions	  by	  upsetting	  access	  to	  elite	  sympathizers	  (Andrews	  2001).	  This	  model	  counters	  interest	  group	  politics	  theory	  and	  prescribes	  an	  inauspicious	  future	  for	  these	  loosely	  defined	  groups	  and	  movements.	  In	  light	  of	  morality	  politics	  theory,	  an	  attempt	  to	  remove	  a	  ban	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  would	  have	  been	  best	  served	  through	  more	  institutional	  means,	  such	  as	  lobbying,	  litigation	  and	  taking	  greater	  advantage	  of	  elite	  allies	  capable	  of	  influencing	  statewide	  public	  opinion	  (Zaller	  1992).	  Therefore,	  while	  YouTube	  sought	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  and	  innovative	  channel	  of	  influence,	  it	  was	  the	  wrong	  platform	  for	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  because	  of	  its	  niche	  audience.	  Although	  elite	  messages	  were	  powerful	  motivators	  for	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign,	  surpassing	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  YouTube	  campaign	  and	  successfully	  narrowing	  the	  gap	  between	  “yes”	  and	  “no”	  votes,	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  context	  of	  Proposition	  8	  muffled	  the	  influence	  of	  these	  elite	  endorsements.	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E. Political	  Opportunity	  Structure	  in	  California:	  Ballot	  Initiatives	  and	  
Ideological	  and	  Partisan	  Divides	  
	   	  Political	  opportunity	  structure	  theory	  asserts	  that	  political	  elites	  significantly	  influence	  public	  opinion	  and	  the	  success	  of	  social	  movements	  	  (Soule	  2004;	  Guigni	  and	  Passy	  1998;	  Zaller	  1992).	  By	  this	  logic,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  social	  movement	  mobilization	  is	  a	  product	  of	  relationships	  with	  elites.	  When	  social	  movements	  have	  the	  benefit	  of	  desired	  political	  conditions,	  such	  as	  elite	  allies,	  favorable	  policy	  outcomes	  will	  be	  easier	  to	  achieve.	  A	  more	  dramatic	  political	  opportunity	  structure	  model	  suggests	  that	  social	  movements	  are	  able	  to	  impact	  policy	  change	  only	  when	  powerful	  elites	  are	  sympathetic	  to	  their	  cause	  (Soule	  2004;	  Guigni	  and	  Passy	  1998).	  This	  model	  theoretically	  predicts	  a	  favorable	  electoral	  outcome	  for	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign.	  However,	  in	  California,	  elite	  influence	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  popularity	  of	  ballot	  initiatives	  and	  thus	  government	  by	  initiative	  has	  replaced	  elite	  decision-­‐making	  as	  the	  preferred	  policymaking	  mechanism	  (Californians	  and	  their	  Government,	  2008).	  There	  is	  a	  general	  consensus	  in	  existing	  literature	  that,	  while	  ostensibly	  a	  pure	  form	  of	  democracy,	  government	  by	  initiative	  in	  fact	  threatens	  democratic	  processes	  and	  reveals	  an	  electoral	  institution	  with	  biased	  ideological	  preferences.	  Given	  the	  dominance	  of	  this	  type	  of	  policymaking,	  electoral	  institutions	  such	  as	  ballot	  initiatives	  must	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  California’s	  political	  opportunity	  structure.	  	  	   David	  S.	  Broder	  sharply	  critiques	  government	  by	  initiative,	  stating	  that	  it	  is	  “not	  a	  government	  of	  laws	  but	  laws	  without	  government”	  (Broder	  2000,	  p.1).	  While	  initiatives	  began	  with	  the	  populist	  movement,	  this	  type	  of	  policymaking	  has	  shifted	  from	  the	  margins	  to	  the	  mainstream.	  Instead	  of	  remaining	  an	  effective	  aid	  for	  labor	  and	  agrarian	  interests,	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government	  by	  initiative	  is	  now	  a	  tool	  wielded	  by	  big	  business;	  success	  in	  initiative	  elections	  is	  largely	  a	  product	  of	  campaign	  spending	  and	  the	  institutional	  strengths	  of	  social	  and	  interest	  groups	  (Ellis	  2002).	  According	  to	  Richard	  J.	  Ellis,	  “the	  initiative	  literally	  belongs	  to	  the	  few	  who	  write	  the	  measures,	  not	  the	  many	  who	  vote”	  (Ellis	  2002,	  p.	  79).	  	  Initiatives	  are	  subject	  to	  convoluted	  wording	  and	  framing	  that	  undermine	  the	  power	  of	  the	  individual	  voter	  and	  subject	  him	  or	  her	  to	  manipulation	  by	  the	  most	  well-­‐funded	  campaign.	  As	  discussed	  above,	  the	  moral	  nature	  of	  Proposition	  8	  made	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign	  accessible	  to	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  voters	  than	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign.	  The	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign	  relied	  more	  on	  emotional	  appeals	  than	  voter	  involvement	  and	  thus	  struck	  more	  powerful	  chords	  with	  the	  electorate.	  The	  outcome	  was	  a	  direct	  vote	  of	  a	  largely	  uninvolved	  public	  (Broder	  2000).	  Thus,	  the	  campaign	  that	  requires	  less	  involvement	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  prevail.	  Broder’s	  insights,	  combined	  with	  the	  implications	  of	  morality	  politics	  theory,	  reveal	  that	  California’s	  ballot	  initiative	  system	  favored	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign.	  In	  order	  to	  gain	  ground,	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  needed	  to	  use	  emotional	  appeals	  more	  effectively	  to	  recruit	  voters	  and	  needed	  more	  time	  to	  raise	  voter	  awareness	  and	  involvement.	  	  This	  paper	  broadens	  the	  scope	  of	  political	  opportunity	  structure	  theories	  to	  include	  not	  only	  elites	  such	  as	  legislators	  and	  judges,	  but	  also	  the	  institutions	  within	  which	  they	  function.	  In	  California,	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  system	  is	  a	  dominant	  lawmaking	  institution.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Proposition	  8,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  divergence	  between	  elite	  sympathies	  and	  institutional	  preferences.	  While	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  system	  is	  sympathetic	  to	  moral	  and	  religious	  legislation,	  elites	  were	  more	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  counter-­‐movement.	  The	  California	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  to	  legalize	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  was	  the	  impetus	  for	  Proposition	  8.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Proposition	  8,	  United	  States	  district	  court	  Judge	  Walker	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overturned	  the	  legislation	  in	  Perry	  v.	  Schwarzenegger	  (2010)	  stating	  that	  it	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  equal	  rights.4	  The	  interplay	  between	  the	  California	  ballot	  initiative	  system	  and	  judicial	  action	  reveals	  that	  certain	  policymaking	  institutions	  are	  better	  suited	  for	  certain	  types	  of	  legislation.	  Even	  though	  elites	  were	  firmly	  supportive	  of	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign,	  their	  influence	  was	  mitigated	  by	  California’s	  ballot	  initiative	  political	  opportunity	  structure.	  While	  this	  paper	  focuses	  on	  the	  religion	  effect	  in	  passing	  Proposition	  8,	  careful	  attention	  must	  also	  be	  paid	  to	  how	  political	  opportunity	  structure	  interacts	  with	  religious	  affiliations,	  the	  implications	  of	  morality	  politics	  theory,	  campaign	  effects	  and	  public	  opinion	  manipulation,	  the	  political	  strength	  of	  churches	  and	  other	  demographic	  variables	  such	  as	  political	  ideology	  orientation	  and	  political	  party	  identification.	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  Proposition	  8	  outcome	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  political	  opportunity	  structure	  theory	  supports	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  moral	  policy	  ballot	  initiatives	  tend	  to	  produce	  more	  conservative	  electoral	  outcomes	  than	  moral	  policies	  that	  are	  decided	  by	  other	  legislative	  means.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  a	  regression	  analysis	  will	  interpret	  the	  most	  important	  predictors	  of	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice.	  	  
	  
III. Empirical	  Analysis	  
	  
	  
A. Research	  Design	  	  	  	   To	  empirically	  evaluate	  the	  relative	  influence	  of	  religion	  and	  campaign	  effects	  on	  Christian	  and	  non-­‐Christian	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice,	  I	  examined	  data	  from	  three	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  plaintiffs	  in	  Perry	  v.	  Schwarzenegger	  “allege	  that	  Proposition	  8	  deprives	  them	  of	  due	  process	  and	  of	  equal	  protection	  of	  the	  laws	  contrary	  to	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment”	  (1).	  Judge	  Walker	  sided	  with	  the	  plaintiffs,	  citing	  that	  “Proposition	  8	  both	  unconstitutionally	  burdens	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  fundamental	  right	  to	  marry	  and	  creates	  an	  irrational	  classification	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sexual	  orientation”	  (109).	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statewide	  surveys	  administered	  by	  the	  Public	  Policy	  Institute	  of	  California	  (PPIC)	  in	  August,	  September	  and	  October	  of	  2008.	  After	  eliminating	  respondents	  who	  failed	  to	  answer	  questions,	  the	  representative	  sample	  included	  3,854	  individuals	  from	  California.	  PPIC	  conducts	  its	  surveys	  through	  random-­‐digit-­‐dialing	  and	  samples	  both	  landlines	  and	  cell	  phone	  lines.	  	  	   Past	  research	  accounts	  for	  the	  stable	  preferences	  of	  Christian	  voters	  and	  predicts	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign	  given	  its	  moral	  standing	  and	  electoral	  context.	  However,	  such	  research	  does	  not	  include	  theories	  suggesting	  a	  narrow	  vote	  margin	  and	  changes	  in	  No	  on	  8	  vote	  over	  time	  (Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999;	  Soule	  2004).	  	  
	  
Case	  Selection	  Proposition	  8	  is	  the	  primary	  case	  study	  for	  several	  reasons.	  The	  Proposition	  appeared	  on	  the	  ballot	  in	  2008,	  the	  same	  year	  as	  a	  presidential	  election.	  Examining	  initiatives	  in	  presidential	  election	  years	  controls	  for	  voter	  participation	  discrepancies	  (Scholzman	  and	  Yohani	  2008).	  Midterm	  elections	  have	  lower	  overall	  participation	  and	  thus	  more	  unpredictable	  electoral	  outcomes.	  	  Presidential	  elections	  attract	  more	  voters;	  therefore,	  Proposition	  8	  voter	  turnout	  was	  more	  representative	  of	  the	  California	  population	  (Scholzman	  and	  Yohani	  2008).	  Thus,	  the	  capacity	  to	  mobilize	  and	  recruit	  voters	  on	  both	  sides	  was	  maximized.	  	  	   Proposition	  8	  was	  also	  a	  citizen	  driven	  ballot	  initiative,	  punctuated	  by	  pivotal	  judicial	  action.	  This	  unique	  context	  contrasts	  direct	  democracy	  with	  representative	  governance.	  The	  court	  cases	  prior	  to	  and	  following	  Proposition	  8	  favored	  same-­‐sex	  marriage;	  however,	  when	  intersected	  by	  popular	  decision-­‐making,	  the	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	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ban	  was	  favored.	  California	  is	  commonly	  known	  as	  a	  liberal	  state;	  House	  and	  Senate	  representatives	  are	  disproportionately	  Democratic	  and	  in	  every	  presidential	  election	  since	  1992,	  the	  state’s	  55	  electoral	  votes	  have	  gone	  to	  the	  Democratic	  candidate.	  The	  discrepancy	  between	  direct	  and	  representative	  patterns	  in	  California	  and	  the	  unique	  interaction	  between	  ballot	  initiatives	  and	  their	  policy	  outcomes	  highlight	  the	  moral	  power	  vested	  in	  ballot	  initiatives	  and	  the	  capacity	  of	  religion	  to	  mobilize	  people,	  not	  leaders.	  	  	   Finally,	  2008	  was	  a	  pivotal	  year	  for	  social	  media-­‐based	  campaign	  strategies.	  This	  new	  platform	  altered	  the	  way	  many	  voters	  received	  and	  digested	  information.	  Such	  a	  unique	  blend	  of	  characteristics	  makes	  California’s	  Proposition	  8	  both	  a	  compelling	  case	  study	  and	  an	  important	  lesson	  in	  citizen	  participation	  and	  religious	  mobilization.	  	  	  
Survey	  Methodology	  	   The	  three	  surveys	  consistently	  asked	  demographic	  and	  politically	  motivated	  questions.	  In	  order	  to	  isolate	  the	  connection	  between	  religion	  and	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice,	  two	  questions	  were	  of	  particular	  interest:	  “Proposition	  8	  is	  called	  the	  “Eliminates	  Right	  of	  Same-­‐Sex	  Couples	  to	  Marry	  Initiative	  Constitutional	  Amendment.”	  	  It	  changes	  the	  California	  Constitution	  to	  eliminate	  the	  right	  of	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  to	  marry.	  	  It	  provides	  that	  only	  marriage	  between	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman	  is	  valid	  or	  recognized	  in	  California.	  	  Fiscal	  impact	  over	  the	  next	  few	  years	  includes	  potential	  revenue	  loss,	  mainly	  sales	  taxes,	  totaling	  in	  the	  several	  tens	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars,	  to	  state	  and	  local	  governments.	  	  In	  the	  long	  run,	  it	  will	  likely	  have	  little	  fiscal	  impact	  on	  state	  and	  local	  governments.	  	  If	  the	  election	  were	  held	  today,	  would	  you	  vote	  yes	  or	  no	  on	  Proposition	  8?	  	   1	   yes	  	   	  2	   no	  8	   [VOL]	  don’t	  know	  9	   [VOL]	  refuse”	  	   “What	  is	  your	  religious	  preference—is	  it	  Protestant,	  Catholic,	  Jewish,	  some	  other	  religion,	  or	  no	  religion?	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   IF	  SOME	  OTHER	  RELIGION,	  ASK:	  Which	  one	  would	  that	  be?	  	   1	   Protestant	  [INCLUDE:	  Baptist,	  Lutheran,	  Methodist,	  Presbyterian,	  Episcopalian,	  Pentecostal,	  Church	  of	  Christ,	  etc.;	  if	  ANY	  question	  punch	  <97>	  and	  specify]	  2	   Catholic	  3	   Jewish	  4	   no	  religion	  (includes:	  not	  a	  believer,	  not	  religious,	  atheist,	  agnostic)	  5	   Buddhism	  6	   Christian;	  just	  Christian	  7	   Hinduism	  8	   Islam	  (Muslim)	  9	   Jehovah's	  Witness	  10	   Latter	  Day	  Saints,	  LDS,	  Mormon	  11	   Native	  American	  12	   Non-­‐denominational	  13	   Orthodox	  Christian	  (e.g.,	  Greek/Russian/Serbian/etc.)	  97	   some	  other	  religion	  [SPECIFY]	  99	   [VOL]	  don't	  know/refused”	  	  Survey	  respondents	  were	  asked	  questions	  regarding	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  only	  if	  they	  were	  either	  a	  registered	  voter	  or	  if	  they	  could	  clearly	  define	  themselves	  as	  leaning	  mostly	  Democratic	  or	  mostly	  Republican.	  Respondents	  who	  did	  not	  know	  or	  were	  not	  registered	  voters	  and	  who	  could	  not	  define	  themselves	  according	  to	  a	  political	  party	  were	  not	  asked	  about	  their	  views	  on	  Proposition	  8.	  The	  regression	  was	  then	  used	  to	  predict	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  across	  the	  set	  of	  demographic	  and	  other	  variables	  provided	  by	  PPIC.	  	  	   	  
Measures	  	  	   The	  main	  independent	  variable	  was	  a	  dummy	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  respondents	  were	  “Christian”	  or	  “non-­‐Christian,”	  with	  non-­‐Christian	  voters	  as	  the	  baseline.	  While	  this	  method	  of	  sorting	  does	  not	  faithfully	  track	  Campbell	  and	  Layman’s	  argument	  that	  the	  religion	  impact	  on	  modern	  politics	  is	  a	  function	  religious	  traditionalism,	  not	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denominational	  membership,	  the	  Christian	  and	  non-­‐Christian	  groups	  do	  combine	  multiple	  denominations	  roughly	  based	  on	  orthodoxy.	  The	  PPIC	  survey	  did	  not	  contain	  a	  measure	  for	  religiosity	  (i.e.	  church	  attendance	  or	  daily	  prayer),	  and	  therefore	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  account	  specifically	  for	  these	  factors	  in	  predicting	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice.	  However,	  the	  Christian	  denominations	  (Protestants,	  Mormons,	  non-­‐denominational	  Christians)	  were	  selected	  in	  order	  reflect	  trends	  in	  religious	  orthodoxy	  (Smidt	  et	  al.	  2008).	  While	  specific	  measures	  were	  not	  used,	  the	  Christian	  group	  should	  exhibit	  greater	  overall	  religious	  traditionalism	  (church	  attendance)	  than	  the	  non-­‐Christian	  group.	  To	  ensure	  that	  the	  measured	  effects	  on	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  were	  strictly	  a	  function	  of	  religious	  preferences,	  multiple	  control	  variables	  were	  included.	  Scales	  were	  used	  for	  age,	  number	  of	  children,	  marital	  status,	  party	  registration,	  income,	  education	  attainment,	  political-­‐ideological	  orientation,	  political	  awareness	  and	  importance	  of	  Proposition	  8	  and	  dummy	  variables	  denoted	  African	  Americans,	  Hispanics,	  Asians,	  Whites	  and	  Males.	  Using	  these	  controls,	  I	  also	  compare	  the	  religion	  effect	  with	  other	  predictive	  demographic	  variables.	  	   	  	  The	  specific	  control	  variables	  were	  selected	  based	  on	  their	  expected	  relative	  importance	  and	  impact	  on	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice.	  It	  is	  anticipated	  that	  homogeneous	  groups	  have	  similar	  voting	  patters,	  particularly	  homogeneous	  ethnic	  groups	  and	  especially	  homogeneous	  political	  party	  and	  political	  ideology	  groups	  (Pew	  2008).	  In	  this	  analysis,	  political	  ideological	  preference	  is	  differentiated	  from	  political	  party	  affiliation.	  	  Therefore,	  both	  measures	  were	  included.	  Education	  often	  predicts	  more	  liberal	  views,	  while	  older	  people	  are	  generally	  more	  conservative,	  and	  younger	  individuals	  are	  generally	  more	  liberal	  (Kanazawa	  2010;	  Ray	  1985).	  	  Finally,	  individuals	  in	  heterosexual	  marriages	  and	  individuals	  with	  children	  might	  exhibit	  certain	  views	  that	  incline	  them	  to	  vote	  for	  or	  against	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Proposition	  8	  regardless	  of	  their	  political	  party,	  ethnicity	  or	  educational	  attainment.	  Heterosexual	  couples	  may	  feel	  that	  condoning	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  dilutes	  their	  relationships	  and	  marriages	  (The	  Conservative	  Case	  for	  Gay	  Marriage;	  Perry	  v.	  Schwarzenegger	  p.60).	  Furthermore,	  individuals	  with	  children	  may	  be	  less	  inclined	  to	  support	  Proposition	  8	  because	  of	  the	  widely	  circulated	  belief	  that	  passage	  of	  the	  Proposition	  would	  require	  teaching	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  California	  public	  schools	  (Perry	  v.	  Schwarzenegger	  p.60,	  105).	  	   	  	  Political	  orientation,	  as	  a	  component	  of	  “political	  religion”	  will	  be	  compared	  with	  the	  religion	  effect	  to	  parse	  out	  Patrikios’	  bidirectional	  causal	  theory	  (2008).	  The	  following	  question	  was	  asked:	  “Q45.	   Next,	  would	  you	  consider	  yourself	  to	  be	  politically:	  	   [READ	  LIST,	  ROTATE	  ORDER	  TOP	  TO	  BOTTOM]	  	   1	   very	  liberal	  2	   somewhat	  liberal	  3	   middle-­‐of-­‐the-­‐road	  4	   somewhat	  conservative	  5	   very	  conservative	  8	   [VOL]	  don’t	  know	  9	   [VOL]	  refuse.”	  	  Incorporating	  political	  orientation	  reinforces	  the	  importance	  of	  “political	  religion,”	  in	  interpreting	  election	  results	  (Patrikios	  2008).	  	   	  The	  religion	  scale	  assigned	  values	  of	  0	  or	  1	  to	  survey	  respondents.	  Non-­‐Christians	  were	  coded	  as	  0	  and	  Mormons,	  Protestants,	  Catholics	  and	  non-­‐denominational	  Christians	  were	  coded	  as	  1.	  	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  was	  coded	  on	  a	  similar	  scale	  with	  0	  indicating	  a	  “no”	  on	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  and	  1	  indicating	  a	  “yes”	  on	  Proposition	  8	  vote.	  Respondents	  with	  children	  were	  coded	  as	  0,	  and	  those	  without	  children	  were	  coded	  as	  1.	  Registered	  Democrats	  were	  coded	  as	  0	  and	  registered	  Republicans	  as	  0.	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  Income,	  education,	  age,	  political	  orientation,	  political	  awareness,	  importance	  of	  Proposition	  8	  and	  marital	  status	  were	  coded	  linearly	  to	  lie	  between	  0	  and	  1	  (0	  meant	  lowest	  income,	  lowest	  education,	  lowest	  age,	  liberal,	  lowest	  political	  awareness,	  lowest	  importance	  of	  Proposition	  8,	  married;	  1	  meant	  highest	  income,	  highest	  education,	  highest	  age,	  conservative,	  highest	  political	  awareness,	  highest	  importance	  of	  Proposition	  8,	  never	  married).	  	  The	  age	  variable	  aggregated	  two	  different	  responses.	  Respondents	  either	  reported	  their	  actual	  numerical	  age	  or	  reported	  their	  age	  within	  a	  range.	  Respondents	  who	  reported	  their	  real	  age	  were	  added	  to	  their	  appropriate	  age	  range	  in	  order	  to	  define	  only	  one	  age	  variable.	  Race	  and	  gender	  were	  coded	  as	  indicator	  variables,	  and	  included	  males,	  Whites,	  Hispanics,	  Asians	  and	  African	  Americans.	  All	  variables	  were	  coded	  to	  lie	  between	  0	  and	  1	  so	  that	  a	  one-­‐unit	  change	  in	  the	  independent	  variable	  infers	  a	  100β	  percentage	  point	  
change	  in	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice.	  	  My	  hypothesis	  predicts	  that	  the	  religion	  effect	  on	  Christian	  voters	  should	  be	  highest	  in	  the	  last	  time	  wave.	  To	  test	  this,	  I	  conducted	  a	  regression	  of	  religion	  and	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  for	  each	  time	  wave	  (August,	  September	  and	  October),	  including	  all	  control	  variables.	  In	  addition,	  I	  created	  an	  interaction	  model	  to	  test	  whether	  the	  religion	  coefficients	  in	  August	  and	  September	  were	  significantly	  different	  from	  the	  religion	  coefficient	  in	  October.	  If	  my	  hypothesis	  is	  supported,	  then	  the	  religion	  coefficient	  should	  be	  largest	  in	  October	  when	  non-­‐Christian	  voters	  should	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  vote	  against	  Proposition	  8	  because	  of	  campaign	  effects	  and	  elite	  influences,	  and	  Christian	  voters	  should	  maintain	  stable	  voting	  preferences.	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Model	  Specifications	  To	  observe	  the	  effect	  of	  religion	  in	  each	  time	  wave	  separately,	  I	  estimate	  the	  following	  regression	  via	  ordinary	  least	  squares:	  
PTime	  i	  =	  α	  +	  β1(RGi)	  +	  β2(Di)	  +	  β3(Ri)+	  β4(Ei)+	  β5(Ii)	  +	  β6(Ai)	  +	  β7(Oi)	  +	  
β8(Wi)	  +	  β9(Bi)	  +	  β10(Hi)	  +	  β11(ASi)	  +	  β12(Mi)	  +	  β13(Ci)	  +	  β14(INi)	  +	  
β15(MEi)+	  β16(AGi)+εi	  
In	  this	  model,	  P	  represents	  the	  predicted	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  in	  a	  given	  time	  
wave,	  and	  each	  β	  represents	  an	  independent	  variable	  coefficient	  or	  estimated	  impact	  of	  the	  
independent	  variable	  on	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice.	  RG	  stands	  for	  religion,	  D	  for	  Democrat,	  
R	  for	  Republican,	  E	  for	  education,	  I	  for	  importance	  of	  Proposition	  8	  outcome,	  A	  for	  political	  awareness,	  O	  for	  political	  orientation,	  W	  for	  white,	  B	  for	  African	  American,	  H	  for	  Hispanic,	  
AS	  for	  Asian,	  M	  for	  married,	  C	  for	  children,	  IN	  for	  income,	  ME	  for	  male	  and	  AG	  for	  age.	  Finally,	  εi	  represents	  random	  error.	  A	  separate	  model	  was	  used	  for	  each	  of	  the	  three	  time	  
waves	  using	  all	  of	  the	  same	  independent	  variables.	  	  In	  the	  final	  model,	  interaction	  terms	  were	  created	  for	  each	  independent	  variable	  with	  the	  first	  two	  time	  waves.	  This	  model	  determines	  whether	  time	  significantly	  impacts	  the	  effect	  of	  each	  independent	  variable	  on	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice.	  	  
Pi	  =	  α	  +	  β1(RGi)	  +	  β2(T1)	  +	  β3(T2)	  +	  β4(RGi	  ×	  T1)	  +	  β5(RGi	  ×	  T2)+…+	  
β48(AGi)	  +	  β49(AGi	  ×	  T1)	  +	  β50(AGi	  ×	  T2)+εi	  	  
In	  this	  model,	  T	  is	  the	  interaction	  term	  “Time,”	  in	  either	  Time	  1	  (August)	  or	  Time	  2	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(September).	  The	  model	  has	  been	  abbreviated	  to	  show	  only	  the	  first	  independent	  variable	  (religion)	  and	  the	  last	  independent	  variable	  (age);	  however	  all	  independent	  variables	  were	  included	  in	  the	  same	  fashion	  in	  the	  interaction	  regression	  model.	  	  
B. Results	  
	  Table	  2	  presents	  the	  effect	  of	  religion	  (with	  controls)	  on	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  in	  each	  time	  wave	  (August,	  September	  and	  October	  2008).	  Table	  3	  presents	  the	  regression	  results	  of	  the	  interaction	  model	  with	  independent	  variables	  and	  August	  and	  September	  time	  waves.	  The	  interaction	  model	  confirms	  that	  the	  predictive	  power	  of	  religion	  and	  other	  key	  predictive	  independent	  variables	  on	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  are	  also	  dependent	  on	  the	  given	  time	  wave.	  Thus,	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  the	  unique	  levels	  of	  each	  independent	  variable,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  independent	  variable	  and	  the	  time	  period	  in	  which	  it	  is	  measured.	  	  Descriptive	  statistics	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  propensity	  to	  vote	  “yes”	  on	  Proposition	  8	  decreases	  with	  time	  among	  non-­‐Christian	  voters,	  while	  Christian	  voters	  maintain	  stable	  voting	  preferences	  (Figure	  1).	  Regression	  results	  confirm	  this	  trend	  and	  accurately	  predict	  an	  amplified	  religion	  effect	  in	  the	  October	  time	  wave,	  when	  non-­‐Christian	  opposition	  to	  Proposition	  8	  is	  strongest	  (Tables	  2	  and	  3).	  	  The	  coefficients	  show	  that	  between	  August	  and	  September	  2008,	  religion	  had	  a	  relatively	  small,	  though	  still	  significant,	  impact	  on	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice,	  but	  by	  October	  2008	  the	  religion	  effect	  more	  than	  doubled	  from	  8%	  in	  August	  to	  18%	  in	  October.	  Figure	  1	  demonstrates	  that	  this	  effect	  was	  a	  result	  of	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increased	  non-­‐Christian	  opposition	  to	  Proposition	  8,	  not	  increased	  Christian	  support	  for	  Proposition	  8	  increased.	  This	  suggests	  a	  campaign	  effect	  among	  non-­‐Christian	  voters.	  	  Figure	  1	  separates	  the	  religion	  variable	  into	  Christian	  and	  non-­‐Christian	  bins	  and	  examines	  changes	  in	  vote	  choice	  across	  time.	  In	  August,	  non-­‐Christian	  support	  for	  Proposition	  8	  was	  45.09%,	  increasing	  to	  47.23%	  in	  September	  and	  then	  decreasing	  quite	  dramatically	  to	  34.13%	  by	  October.	  Christian	  support	  for	  Proposition	  8	  was	  relatively	  constant	  over	  the	  three-­‐month	  period:	  64.30%	  in	  August,	  65.92%	  in	  September,	  and	  then	  63.87%	  in	  October.	  The	  religion	  effect,	  when	  aggregated	  with	  campaign	  effects	  such	  as	  influential	  elite	  discourse	  and	  media	  endorsements,	  motivates	  non-­‐Christian	  opposition,	  while	  keeping	  Christian	  support	  for	  Proposition	  8	  relatively	  constant.	  Consistent	  with	  evidence	  from	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  analysis	  discussed	  earlier,	  it	  appears	  that	  non-­‐Christian	  respondents	  were	  encouraged	  by	  the	  campaign	  to	  adjust	  their	  vote	  choice	  closer	  to	  the	  election.	  Campaign	  effects	  on	  Christian	  voters	  are	  not	  demonstrated	  by	  these	  regression	  results.	  Their	  stable	  preferences	  seem	  impervious	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  either	  campaign.	  The	  deeply	  held	  values	  of	  Christian	  voters	  produced	  vote	  preferences	  independent	  of	  campaign	  effects,	  and	  presumably	  before	  the	  PPIC	  surveys	  were	  conducted.	  Voter	  education	  and	  awareness	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  play	  a	  role	  for	  Christian	  voters,	  their	  deeply	  held	  values	  were	  not	  stirred	  directly	  by	  campaign	  appeals,	  but	  appear	  to	  stem	  from	  pre-­‐existing,	  immutable	  beliefs.	  Religion’s	  most	  significant	  effect	  is	  as	  a	  predictor	  of	  non-­‐Christian	  opposition	  to	  Proposition	  8,	  not	  Christian	  support	  for	  Proposition	  8.	  	  Consistent	  with	  my	  first	  hypothesis,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice.	  Over	  time,	  the	  religion	  effect	  increasingly	  distinguishes	  “yes”	  and	  “no”	  votes	  on	  Proposition	  8	  based	  on	  Christian	  and	  non-­‐Christian	  religious	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identifications.	  In	  order	  to	  abate	  the	  inherent	  advantages	  of	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign,	  non-­‐Christian	  religious	  differentiation	  combines	  with	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  effects,	  elite	  messages	  and	  media	  endorsement	  to	  create	  a	  narrower	  vote	  margin	  between	  Proposition	  8	  supporters	  and	  opponents.	  	  While	  ballot	  initiatives	  are	  inherently	  biased	  towards	  conservative	  policies,	  these	  effects	  narrowed	  the	  gap	  between	  “yes”	  and	  “no”	  on	  8	  votes.	  Table	  6	  shows	  the	  regression	  results	  of	  the	  interaction	  model	  with	  religion,	  all	  of	  the	  control	  variables,	  and	  the	  first	  two	  time	  waves.	  I	  multiply	  the	  estimated	  total	  effect	  of	  each	  independent	  and	  control	  variable	  by	  the	  first	  two	  time	  waves	  (August	  and	  September).	  These	  interaction	  terms	  measure	  the	  importance	  of	  changes	  in	  time	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  specific	  variables,	  thus	  accounting	  for	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  variables	  as	  a	  function	  of	  time.	  	  Holding	  all	  other	  variables	  constant,	  I	  find	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  religion	  in	  the	  last	  time	  wave	  is	  both	  high	  and	  significant,	  and	  unique	  to	  the	  third	  time	  wave.	  The	  religion	  coefficient	  in	  the	  first	  time	  wave	  is	  both	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  (β	  =.09,	  p=.001,	  two-­‐tailed).	  	  In	  the	  third	  time	  wave,	  religion’s	  predictive	  power	  peaks	  (β	  =.18,	  p=.000,	  two-­‐tailed).	  Thus,	  the	  effect	  of	  religion	  on	  vote	  choice	  is	  twice	  as	  big	  in	  October	  compared	  to	  August,	  suggesting	  that	  campaign	  effects	  made	  religion	  more	  salient	  among	  non-­‐Christian	  voters	  and	  motivated	  them	  to	  vote	  “no”	  on	  Proposition	  8.	  This	  effect	  is	  both	  large	  and	  significant	  when	  compared	  with	  changes	  in	  other	  vote	  predicting	  variables	  over	  time.	  	  While	  religion	  is	  a	  statistically	  significant	  variable	  in	  all	  three	  time	  models	  (paugust<.005;	  pseptember<.001;	  poctober<.0001),	  its	  significance	  increases	  with	  each	  time	  wave,	  further	  highlighting	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  religion	  and	  time	  interaction.	  I	  conducted	  F	  tests	  on	  model	  significance	  and	  find	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  religion	  effect	  in	  August	  2008	  and	  October	  2008	  and	  between	  September	  2008	  and	  October	  2008	  is	  significant	  (p<.	  0001),	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while	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  religion	  effects	  in	  August	  2008	  and	  September	  2008	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant	  (p	  =	  .58).	  This	  measure	  of	  model	  significance	  underscores	  the	  impact	  of	  campaign	  effects	  and	  elite	  messages	  for	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign,	  particularly	  in	  the	  last	  time	  wave.	  Furthermore,	  the	  model	  demonstrates	  the	  increasing	  importance	  of	  religious	  identification	  as	  a	  means	  distinguishing	  between	  Proposition	  8	  support	  and	  opposition.	  	  Several	  expected	  significant	  control	  variables	  ultimately	  produced	  insignificant	  regression	  results.	  Higher	  education	  typically	  forecasts	  more	  liberal	  attitudes	  and	  should	  predict	  a	  “no”	  on	  8	  vote.	  While	  the	  negative	  coefficients	  for	  education	  demonstrate	  this	  theory,	  the	  coefficients	  were	  not	  statistically	  significant	  (Kanazawa	  2010).	  	  Education	  does	  predict	  opposition	  to	  Proposition	  8,	  but	  other	  effects	  have	  more	  significant	  predictive	  power	  relative	  to	  vote	  choice.	  Similarly,	  the	  coefficients	  for	  African	  American	  and	  Hispanic	  individuals	  were	  insignificant	  even	  though	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  individuals	  in	  these	  ethnic	  groups	  belong	  to	  Christian	  religious	  groups	  that	  were	  expected	  to	  vote	  in	  favor	  of	  Proposition	  8	  (New	  York	  Times,	  September	  20,	  2008).	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  in	  determining	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice,	  the	  religion	  factor	  supersedes	  the	  race	  factor.	  Marital	  status	  was	  also	  an	  insignificant	  predictor.	  Heterosexual	  married	  couples	  are	  often	  less	  likely	  to	  support	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  out	  of	  a	  fear	  that	  their	  marriage	  will	  somehow	  be	  weaker	  if	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  is	  legalized	  (The	  Guardian,	  September	  16,	  2008).	  	  In	  terms	  of	  a	  “family	  effect,”	  having	  children	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  better	  predictor	  of	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  than	  the	  marital	  status	  of	  the	  voter.	  The	  more	  limited	  predictive	  capacity	  of	  political	  party	  registration	  in	  2008	  underscores	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  religion	  factor.	  	  Partisanship	  should	  be	  a	  powerful	  
Baker	   50	  
predictor	  of	  views	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  (Pew	  2008;	  Campbell	  and	  Monson	  2007).	  	  Partisanship	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  analogous	  with	  ideological	  homogeneity,	  and	  thus	  political	  party	  identification	  should	  strongly	  predict	  with	  homogeneous	  views	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  policy.	  The	  registered	  Democrat	  coefficient	  is	  -­‐.099;	  registered	  Democrats	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  vote	  “yes”	  on	  Proposition	  8	  than	  Republicans.	  The	  registered	  Republican	  coefficient	  is	  .086,	  indicating	  that	  Republicans	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  vote	  “yes”	  on	  Proposition	  8	  than	  Democrats.	  While	  these	  results	  accurately	  reinforce	  the	  ideological	  trends	  of	  Republicans	  and	  Democrats,	  party	  identification	  is	  less	  predictive	  of	  vote	  choice	  than	  religion.	  This	  supports	  the	  notion	  that	  moral	  policy	  preferences	  transcend	  partisan	  lines	  and	  religious	  identification	  proves	  stronger	  than	  partisan	  identification	  when	  moral	  policies	  are	  at	  stake.	  These	  results	  can	  be	  extrapolated	  to	  explain	  Democratic	  President	  Bill	  Clinton’s	  passage	  of	  DOMA	  in	  1996.	  Both	  Republican	  and	  Democrat	  identification	  coefficients	  are	  statistically	  significant	  (pdemocrat=.002;	  prepublican=.015)	  but,	  unlike	  religion,	  neither	  changes	  significantly	  over	  time	  in	  predictive	  capacity.	  Thus,	  in	  determining	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice,	  the	  religious	  identification	  coefficient	  tells	  a	  more	  interesting	  story	  that	  more	  aptly	  links	  to	  campaign	  effects	  and	  predicts	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice.	  Partisanship,	  often	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  powerful	  predictor	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  attitudes,	  is	  eclipsed	  by	  the	  growing	  impact	  of	  religion	  over	  time.	  	  Other	  control	  variables	  demonstrate	  other	  significant	  findings.	  Consistent	  with	  previous	  research,	  political	  orientation	  has	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  (Patrikios	  2008).	  Political	  orientation	  is	  consistently	  the	  strongest	  predictor	  of	  vote	  choice	  across	  the	  three	  time	  waves.	  However,	  the	  greater	  significance	  of	  religion	  is	  highlighted	  because	  its	  predictive	  capacity	  remains	  weak	  until	  the	  last	  time	  wave,	  when	  it	  becomes	  the	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second	  most	  foretelling	  variable	  of	  vote	  choice,	  after	  political	  orientation.	  The	  joint	  impact	  of	  political	  orientation	  and	  religion	  supports	  Patrikios’	  political	  religion	  hypothesis:	  that	  the	  bidirectional	  causal	  relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  partisanship	  accounts	  for	  both	  religious	  affiliations	  and	  political	  policy	  proclivities.	  In	  my	  model,	  respondents	  that	  identified	  with	  a	  conservative	  political	  orientation	  were	  48%	  more	  likely	  to	  vote	  “yes”	  on	  Proposition	  8,	  holding	  all	  other	  variables	  constant	  (p=.000).	  	  This	  joint	  effect	  reinforces	  the	  bidirectional	  relationship	  between	  religious	  affiliations	  and	  ideological	  preferences;	  however	  it	  poses	  a	  problem	  for	  Layman’s	  path	  model	  (Patrikios	  2008;	  Layman	  2001-­‐	  Figure	  5).	  In	  this	  case,	  religious	  traditionalism	  is	  not	  funneled	  through	  moral	  policy	  preferences	  to	  produce	  ideological	  preferences;	  instead,	  religious	  traditionalism	  and	  ideological	  preferences	  appear	  to	  exert	  a	  joint,	  simultaneous	  influence	  on	  moral	  policy	  preferences.	  The	  relationship	  between	  political	  orientation	  and	  religion	  underscores	  the	  importance	  of	  examining	  both	  religion	  and	  political	  ideology	  as	  factors	  that	  reinforce	  each	  other	  and	  work	  in	  tandem	  to	  create	  policy	  preferences	  (Patrikios	  2008).	  	  Gender,	  age,	  respondent’s	  number	  of	  children,	  and	  perceived	  importance	  of	  Proposition	  8	  all	  exhibit	  significant	  predictive	  capacities	  (pgender<.10;	  page<.001;	  
pchildren<.001).	  Older	  voters	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  Proposition	  8,	  consistent	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  older	  individuals	  hold	  more	  conservative	  values	  both	  absolutely	  and	  relatively	  (Ray	  1985).	  While	  older	  voters	  appear	  may	  liberalize	  over	  time	  according	  to	  changing	  social	  and	  political	  norms,	  they	  still	  hold	  more	  conservative	  views	  relative	  to	  the	  general	  population	  (Ray	  1985).	  They	  exhibit	  a	  higher	  propensity	  to	  vote	  in	  favor	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans,	  as	  opposed	  to	  their	  younger	  counterparts	  (p=.001).	  The	  regression	  results	  indicate	  that	  the	  interaction	  between	  age	  and	  time	  parallels	  the	  religion	  effect	  in	  predicting	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Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice.	  The	  impact	  of	  age	  on	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  increases	  with	  time.	  Overall,	  older	  age	  predicts	  a	  “yes”	  vote;	  however,	  time	  interactions	  show	  that	  middle	  
age	  voters	  gradually	  increase	  their	  opposition	  to	  Proposition	  8,	  while	  support	  of	  Proposition	  8	  increases	  among	  older	  voters.	  Between	  August	  and	  October,	  the	  predictive	  capacity	  of	  age	  doubles,	  with	  statistically	  significant	  results	  both	  in	  the	  interaction	  model	  and	  the	  base	  model	  for	  September	  and	  October.	  Campaign	  effects	  can	  account	  for	  this	  change	  among	  middle	  age	  voters.	  As	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  arguments	  became	  stronger	  and	  more	  accessible	  through	  media	  and	  elite	  endorsements,	  on	  a	  whole,	  voters	  between	  ages	  34	  and	  64	  became	  more	  supportive	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  between	  August	  and	  October	  2008.	  Voters	  between	  ages	  34	  and	  44	  increased	  their	  opposition	  to	  Proposition	  8	  from	  39%	  to	  43%	  opposed	  to	  Proposition	  8.	  Voters	  between	  ages	  44	  and	  54	  increased	  their	  Proposition	  8	  opposition	  from	  40%	  to	  50%	  between	  August	  and	  October,	  the	  most	  significant	  increase	  of	  all	  age	  segments	  surveyed.	  The	  oldest	  segment,	  voters	  over	  age	  64,	  increased	  their	  support	  of	  Proposition	  8	  by	  a	  small	  margin	  in	  the	  October	  time	  wave.	  Campaign	  effects	  support	  this	  result	  through	  two	  lenses.	  The	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  was	  least	  accessible	  to	  older	  voters;	  tactics	  targeted	  young	  voters	  through	  social	  media,	  and	  endorsements	  by	  popular	  public	  figures	  were	  less	  salient	  for	  the	  over	  64	  age	  group.	  Thus,	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign	  was	  more	  accessible	  to	  older	  voters	  and	  produced	  a	  magnified	  age	  effect	  in	  the	  last	  time	  wave.	  Overall,	  the	  age	  effect	  is	  most	  dramatically	  seen	  in	  middle	  age	  voters,	  while	  the	  youngest	  group	  of	  voters	  maintained	  stable	  preferences	  over	  time	  in	  favor	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  Older	  voters	  maintained	  mostly	  stable	  preferences	  in	  support	  of	  Proposition	  8,	  with	  a	  small	  jump	  in	  support	  closest	  to	  the	  election.	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Voters	  with	  children	  were	  almost	  7%	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  Proposition	  8,	  a	  finding	  that	  closely	  parallels	  campaign	  strategies	  (Campbell	  2007).	  A	  critical	  strategy	  for	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign	  was	  to	  target	  voters	  with	  children	  by	  capitalizing	  on	  an	  ambiguously	  ascertained	  belief	  that	  California	  public	  elementary	  schools	  would	  be	  required	  to	  teach	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  should	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  become	  legalized	  (Perry	  v.	  Schwarzenegger	  p.	  105).	  The	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign	  used	  this	  non-­‐religious	  and	  non-­‐partisan	  appeal	  to	  attract	  a	  new	  voting	  bloc	  that	  could	  widen	  their	  base	  of	  support	  instead	  of	  restricting	  it	  to	  those	  who	  were	  already	  ideologically	  and	  religiously	  inclined	  to	  favor	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  (California	  Voters	  Guide,	  2008).	  	  The	  impact	  of	  gender	  on	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice	  was	  limited,	  but	  significant.	  Men	  were	  4%	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  the	  ban	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  than	  women	  (p=.080),	  again	  consistent	  with	  studies	  that	  suggest	  that	  men	  are	  not	  only	  more	  conservative	  than	  women	  on	  the	  whole,	  but	  also	  hold	  more	  hostile	  views	  towards	  homosexuality	  than	  women	  (Herek	  1988).	  	  Finally,	  voters	  who	  believed	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  Proposition	  8	  was	  “very	  important”	  (versus	  “not	  important	  at	  all”)	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  support	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  (p=.000).	  This	  finding	  contradicts	  morality	  politics	  theory	  and	  offers	  a	  more	  favorable	  and	  successful	  outlook	  for	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign.	  Moral	  politics	  theory	  predicts	  that	  individuals	  with	  deeply	  held	  religious	  beliefs	  assume	  powerful	  and	  compelling	  policy	  preferences	  and	  become	  invested	  in	  electoral	  outcomes,	  thus	  increasing	  their	  political	  participation	  (Haider-­‐Markel	  and	  Meier	  1999;	  Campbell	  and	  Monson	  2007).	  	  	  However,	  those	  who	  viewed	  Proposition	  8	  as	  more	  important	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  vote	  in	  favor	  of	  it.	  An	  explanation	  for	  this	  effect	  lies	  in	  the	  decrease	  in	  non-­‐religious	  support	  for	  Proposition	  8	  in	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the	  last	  time	  wave.	  As	  campaign	  strategies	  increased	  mobilization	  against	  Proposition	  8	  and	  elite	  messages	  and	  media	  endorsements	  became	  more	  frequent	  and	  influential,	  the	  perceived	  importance	  of	  the	  election	  for	  non-­‐Christian	  voters	  increased.	  In	  contrast,	  Proposition	  8	  supporters	  with	  intuitive	  policy	  preferences	  were	  less	  compelled	  to	  become	  involved	  because	  their	  decisions	  required	  less	  external	  information	  gathering.	  Therefore,	  while	  the	  views	  of	  Proposition	  8	  supporters	  may	  have	  been	  strong	  in	  an	  absolute	  sense,	  the	  importance	  of	  Proposition	  8	  outcome	  as	  perceived	  by	  Christian	  voters	  within	  the	  greater	  2008	  election	  context	  was	  marginal,	  paralleling	  similar	  findings	  from	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  ballot	  propositions	  in	  the	  2004	  election	  (Campbell	  2007).	  	  	  	  
C. Discussion	  and	  Conclusions	  
	  This	  regression	  analysis	  allows	  one	  to	  compare	  different	  vote-­‐predicting	  variables	  across	  time.	  For	  example,	  how	  does	  religion	  compare	  to	  political	  orientation	  or	  party	  registration	  in	  predicting	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  choice?	  Furthermore,	  religion	  effects	  can	  be	  compared	  with	  the	  effects	  of	  other	  demographic	  variables	  such	  as	  age	  and	  gender.	  These	  results	  can	  then	  be	  used	  to	  more	  effectively	  frame	  campaign	  narratives	  and	  implement	  campaign	  strategies	  supporting	  or	  opposing	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans.	  Strategies	  can	  be	  adjusted	  and	  adopted	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  morally	  biased	  electoral	  context,	  or	  to	  attempt	  to	  change	  the	  legislative	  context	  in	  order	  to	  make	  policymaking	  conditions	  more	  conducive	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  campaign.	  	  Further	  research	  can	  delve	  more	  deeply	  into	  the	  specific	  devotional	  patterns	  of	  the	  Christian	  and	  non-­‐Christian	  groups	  used	  in	  my	  research	  design.	  The	  PPIC	  survey	  did	  not	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account	  for	  religion	  in	  any	  quantifiable	  way,	  such	  as	  church	  attendance	  or	  frequency	  of	  prayer,	  two	  commonly	  used	  measurements	  of	  religion	  (Smidt	  et	  al	  2008;	  Campbell	  2007).	  Thus,	  the	  results	  do	  not	  provide	  an	  entirely	  precise	  comparison	  between	  religious	  traditionalists	  and	  “religious	  left”	  coalitions.	  I	  measure	  religion	  as	  it	  affects	  Christian	  and	  non-­‐Christian	  vote	  choice,	  but	  I	  could	  not	  examine	  and	  compare	  practicing	  versus	  non-­‐practicing	  Christians	  and	  evaluate	  the	  differences	  and	  similarities	  in	  their	  voter	  behavior.	  	  While	  the	  Christian	  and	  non-­‐Christian	  groups	  were	  selected	  based	  on	  commonly	  held	  conceptions	  of	  devotional	  styles,	  an	  additional	  measure	  for	  religious	  orthodoxy	  should	  be	  included	  in	  further	  research.	  	  The	  results	  of	  my	  analysis	  do	  allow	  a	  comparison	  of	  Christian	  and	  non-­‐Christian	  policy	  preferences	  over	  time.	  By	  juxtaposing	  vote	  choice	  changes	  between	  August	  and	  October	  2008,	  the	  results	  reveal	  that	  while	  Christians	  had	  consistent	  policy	  preferences,	  non-­‐Christians	  changed	  their	  policy	  preferences	  closest	  to	  the	  election	  as	  a	  result	  of	  elite	  messages,	  enhanced	  campaign	  effects	  and	  strong	  media	  endorsements.	  Christian	  support	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  was	  independent	  of	  time	  change,	  while	  non-­‐Christians	  adjusted	  their	  support	  as	  campaign	  effects	  increased	  over	  time.	  Campaign	  effects	  facilitated	  a	  change	  in	  policy	  preferences	  only	  among	  non-­‐Christians,	  while	  policy	  preferences	  among	  Christian	  voters	  remained	  stable	  over	  time,	  consistent	  with	  morality	  politics	  theory.	  Applying	  these	  conclusions	  to	  create	  a	  more	  successful	  campaign	  strategy,	  Proposition	  8	  opposition	  could	  have	  started	  their	  campaign	  efforts	  earlier,	  accelerating	  effects	  that	  did	  not	  appear	  until	  October	  2008	  when	  it	  was	  too	  late	  to	  significantly	  impact	  election	  results.	  Earlier	  efforts,	  such	  as	  reaching	  out	  to	  potential	  elite	  endorsers,	  may	  have	  allowed	  the	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ascending	  trend	  of	  No	  on	  8	  support	  to	  peak	  by	  November,	  instead	  of	  after	  the	  2008	  election.	  	  	  This	  research	  lays	  the	  groundwork	  for	  future	  studies	  on	  religion,	  campaign	  effects	  and	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  ballot	  initiatives.	  While	  ballot	  initiatives	  are	  controversial,	  ostensibly	  affirming	  pure	  democratic	  processes,	  they	  inevitably	  alienate	  some	  minorities.	  This	  research	  interprets	  the	  Proposition	  8	  election	  outcome	  and	  shows	  how	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  supporters	  can	  adjust	  policymaking	  conditions	  and	  campaign	  strategies	  to	  best	  achieve	  their	  goals	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  ballot	  initiative.	  Future	  research	  should	  investigate	  states	  where	  efforts	  to	  legalize	  or	  ban	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  are	  exercised	  through	  different	  institutions,	  either	  judicial	  or	  legislative,	  and	  compare	  these	  results	  with	  those	  of	  ballot	  initiatives.	  Research	  should	  also	  be	  done	  to	  compare	  the	  Proposition	  8	  political	  climate	  and	  vote-­‐predicting	  variables	  with	  other	  states	  that	  have	  recently	  participated	  in	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  debates	  (e.g.,	  Hawaii,	  the	  11	  states	  that	  participated	  in	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  elections	  in	  2004,	  and	  the	  five	  states	  where	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  is	  currently	  legal).	  Such	  research	  should	  look	  at	  campaign	  effects	  and	  delve	  more	  deeply	  into	  the	  religion	  factor	  by	  looking	  at	  measured	  levels	  of	  religiosity	  instead	  of	  	  “yes”	  or	  “no”	  identifications.	  	  The	  role	  of	  the	  Christian	  vote	  as	  revealed	  by	  this	  research	  holds	  implications	  for	  campaigns	  and	  ballot	  initiatives	  in	  general.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign,	  these	  results	  indicate	  that	  there	  should	  be	  less	  of	  a	  focus	  on	  voters	  who	  already	  identify	  as	  Christian	  and	  more	  focus	  on	  voters	  without	  a	  clearly	  defined	  religious	  position.	  The	  success	  of	  morality	  politics	  theory	  with	  respect	  to	  vote	  choice	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  further	  suggests	  that	  the	  pro	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  ban	  campaigns	  should	  continue	  to	  use	  universal	  and	  religiously	  grounded	  moral	  appeals	  to	  sustain	  their	  religious	  coalitions.	  Furthermore,	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because	  Christian	  voters	  will	  likely	  have	  consistent	  views,	  relatively	  unchanged	  by	  campaign	  messages,	  pro	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  ban	  campaigns	  can	  use	  other	  appeals	  that	  will	  not	  alienate	  non-­‐Christian	  voters.	  These	  voters	  will	  be	  more	  susceptible	  to	  campaign	  effects	  but	  may	  not	  respond	  well	  to	  religious	  messages.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Proposition	  8,	  the	  appeal	  to	  families	  with	  children	  was	  a	  successful	  non-­‐religious	  strategy	  for	  the	  Yes	  on	  8	  campaign.	  Conversely,	  for	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign,	  the	  results	  indicate	  that	  campaign	  messages	  are	  crucial,	  because	  pro	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  arguments	  are	  intuitively	  grounded	  in	  deeply	  held	  moral	  values.	  This	  campaign	  should	  focus	  on	  non-­‐Christian	  voters	  who	  will	  be	  more	  easily	  swayed	  by	  campaign	  messages.	  Furthermore,	  it	  should	  capitalize	  on	  elite	  sympathies	  and	  the	  power	  and	  influence	  of	  elite	  messages	  to	  manipulate	  public	  opinion.	  This	  campaign	  can	  also	  attempt	  use	  of	  alternative,	  non-­‐religious	  moral	  appeals.	  Although	  morality	  politics	  theory	  was	  not	  originally	  intended	  for	  application	  in	  “anti-­‐moral”	  cases	  (i.e.	  pro	  same-­‐sex	  marriage),	  perhaps	  moral	  appeals	  can	  be	  successful	  in	  a	  non-­‐religious,	  non-­‐biblical	  framework.	  For	  example,	  equality	  and	  human	  rights	  are	  universal	  moral	  principles	  that	  could	  be	  utilized	  by	  pro	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  campaigns.	  While	  the	  No	  on	  8	  campaign	  used	  this	  method,	  the	  electoral	  context	  muted	  same	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  messages	  and	  weakened	  the	  persuasive	  power	  of	  legislative,	  entertainment	  and	  media	  elite	  messages.	  More	  research	  should	  be	  conducted	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  these	  “reverse”	  moral	  appeals,	  to	  determine	  what	  campaign	  conditions	  and	  content	  platforms	  are	  most	  favorable.	  	  	  My	  analysis	  shows	  that	  religion	  can	  significantly	  differentiate	  “yes”	  and	  “no”	  Proposition	  8	  voters.	  While	  religion	  consistently	  predicts	  moral	  voting	  preferences	  of	  Christian	  individuals,	  it	  also	  combines	  with	  campaign	  effects	  and	  elite	  preferences	  to	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predict	  the	  voting	  behavior	  of	  non-­‐Christian	  individuals.	  Furthermore,	  political	  orientation	  and	  ideology	  are	  important	  factors	  in	  these	  vote	  decisions	  and	  must	  be	  viewed	  as	  part	  of	  a	  symbiotic	  relationship	  with	  religion	  (Campbell	  2007;	  Layman	  2001;	  Patrikios	  2008).	  This	  research	  reveals	  ways	  in	  which	  religion	  benefits	  from	  political	  opportunity	  structure,	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  wielded	  in	  morally	  based	  campaigns	  to	  alter	  voter	  behavior	  and	  manipulate	  public	  opinion.	  Conversely	  non-­‐religious	  appeals	  supporting	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  will	  be	  more	  successful	  if	  they	  take	  the	  form	  of	  more	  discrete	  policymaking	  approaches	  that	  seek	  to	  directly	  influence	  elites,	  rather	  than	  the	  ordinary	  citizens.	  This	  finding	  has	  significant	  implications	  for	  the	  future	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  legislation	  and	  minority	  rights	  legislation	  in	  general.	  If	  moral	  decisions	  are	  made	  in	  obscurity,	  has	  the	  democratic	  process	  necessarily	  been	  compromised?	  Is	  it	  more	  important	  to	  sacrifice	  direct	  democracy	  to	  protect	  minority	  rights,	  or	  to	  protect	  an	  ostensibly	  pure	  democratic	  institution	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  minority	  rights?	  David	  Campbell’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  2004	  election	  argues	  that	  the	  election	  in	  some	  ways	  became	  a	  “plebiscite	  on	  private	  beliefs,”	  rather	  than	  a	  “reaffirmation	  of	  shared	  democratic	  beliefs.”	  He	  asserts	  that	  the	  “nonbargainable”	  nature	  of	  moral	  policies	  “can	  tax	  and	  even	  shut	  down	  democratic	  discourse”	  (Campbell	  2007,	  p.	  116).	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  perhaps	  government	  by	  representation	  is	  more	  “democratic”	  than	  direct	  democracy	  (Broder	  2000;	  Scholzman	  and	  Yohani	  2008).	  	  Further	  research	  can	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  moral	  policymaking	  and	  adherence	  to	  democratic	  processes	  and	  values.	  According	  to	  a	  Gallup	  poll,	  support	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  the	  United	  States	  has	  been	  gradually	  increasing	  over	  the	  last	  four	  years	  across	  religious	  groups,	  ethnic	  groups,	  gender,	  age	  groups	  and	  political	  parties	  (Saad	  2010).	  Given	  this	  trend,	  it	  will	  be	  important	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to	  measure	  the	  success	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  ballot	  initiatives	  in	  the	  future	  and	  note	  whether	  religious	  and	  non-­‐religious	  groups	  make	  adjustments	  in	  their	  campaign	  strategies	  and	  policymaking	  methods.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  will	  be	  examining	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  religious	  traditionalists	  reconcile	  their	  moral	  views	  with	  a	  majority	  public	  opinion	  that	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  opposed	  to	  their	  worldview.	  If	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  continue	  to	  dominate	  state	  legislation,	  then	  the	  strength	  of	  these	  religious	  institutions	  will	  be	  reinforced.	  However,	  if	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bans	  decrease	  with	  time,	  this	  could	  be	  a	  reflection	  on	  the	  changing	  strategies	  of	  pro	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  groups,	  evolving	  and	  increasingly	  liberal	  public	  opinion	  and/or	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  absolute	  impact	  of	  religious-­‐political	  coalitions.	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Appendix	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Proposition	  8	  Vote	  and	  Religious	  Affiliations	  Across	  Time	  
	  
Survey	  Date	   Proposition	  8	  Vote	   Christian	  	  
Non-­‐
Christian	  	   N	   X
2	  (1)	   P	  
August	  
Yes	  on	  8	   64.30%	   45.09%	   775	  
	   	  
No	  on	  8	   35.70%	   54.91%	   625	  
Total	   100%	   100%	   1,400	   52.033	   P<.	  001	  
September	  
Yes	  on	  8	   65.92%	   47.23%	   806	  
	   	  
No	  on	  8	   34.08%	   52.77%	   601	  
Total	   100%	   100%	   1,	  407	   49.91	   P<	  .001	  
October	  
Yes	  on	  8	   63.87%	   34.13%	   746	  
	   	  
No	  on	  8	   36.13%	   65.87%	   714	  
Total	   100%	   100%	   1,	  460	   126.58	   P<	  .001	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Table	  2:	  OLS	  Regression	  Predicting	  Proposition	  8	  Vote	  Choice	   	  
***p<.001;	  **p<.01;	  *p<.05;	  +p<.10	  	  	  (two-­‐tailed)	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  	  1	  Survey	  respondents	  who	  were	  asked	  to	  give	  their	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  preference	  were	  asked	  a	  follow	  up	  question	  to	  determine	  how	  important	  they	  felt	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  proposition	  was:	  “How	  important	  to	  you	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  vote	  on	  Proposition	  8—is	  it	  very	  important,	  somewhat	  important,	  not	  too	  important,	  or	  not	  at	  all	  important?”	  The	  negative	  coefficient	  means	  voters	  who	  voted	  “no”	  on	  Proposition	  8	  ranked	  the	  proposition	  as	  more	  important.	  2	  Survey	  respondents	  were	  asked	  to	  describe	  their	  ideological	  political	  preferences	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  very	  liberal	  to	  very	  conservative.	  The	  following	  question	  was	  asked,	  “Next,	  would	  you	  consider	  yourself	  to	  be	  politically:”	  The	  positive	  coefficient	  means	  that	  voters	  who	  voted	  “yes”	  on	  Proposition	  8	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  conservative.	  
	  
	  
	   August	  2008	   September	  2008	   October	  2008	  
β1:	  Religion	   0.09***	  (.028)	   0.07**	  (.026)	   0.18***	  (.027)	  
β2:	  	  Registered	  Democrat	   -­‐0.06+	  (.033)	   -­‐0.12***	  (.033)	   -­‐0.10**	  (.031)	  
β3:	  Registered	  Republican	   0.10**	  (.037)	   0.05	  (.037)	   0.09*(.035)	  
β4:	  Education	   -­‐0.03	  (.052)	   -­‐0.02	  (.048)	   -­‐0.04	  (.048)	  
β5:	  Prop	  8	  Important1	   -­‐0.20***	  (.042)	   -­‐0.27***	  (.039)	   -­‐0.26***	  (.041)	  
β6:	  Political	  Awareness	   0.04	  (.052)	   0.05	  (.0537)	   0.05	  (.050)	  
β7:	  Political	  Orientation2	   0.46***	  (.051)	   0.53***	  (.049)	   0.48***	  (.047)	  
β8:	  White	   -­‐0.02	  (.078)	   -­‐0.07	  (.067)	   -­‐0.17*	  (.071)	  
β9:	  African	  American	   0.09	  (.092)	   0.01	  (.081)	   -­‐0.02	  (.084)	  
β10:	  Hispanic	   0.08	  (.084)	   0.01	  (.073)	   -­‐0.07	  (.076)	  
β11:	  	  Asian	   0.10	  (.097)	   0.03	  (.098)	   -­‐0.003	  (.086)	  
β12:	  Married	   -­‐0.02	  (.029)	   0.01	  (.029)	   0.02	  (.028)	  
β13:	  Children	   0.07*	  (.030)	   0.05+	  (.030)	   0.07*	  (.029)	  
β14:	  Income	   -­‐0.11*	  (.051)	   -­‐0.10*	  (.048)	   -­‐0.04	  (.048)	  
β15:	  Male	   0.09***	  (.026)	   0.06*	  (.025)	   0.04+	  (.024)	  
β16:	  Age	   0.08	  (.052)	   0.14**	  (.051)	   0.16***	  (.048)	  
α: Constant	   0.14	  (.101)	   0.17*	  (.088)	   0.22*	  (.092)	  	  
N	   1260	   1273	   1321	  
R2	   .21	   .26	   .28	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Figure	  2:	  Religion	  Coefficients	  with	  Confidence	  Intervals	  across	  Time3	  	  	  






































	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  N	  =	  1260	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  N	  =	  1273	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  N	  =	  1321	   	   	  
Survey	  Date	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Table	  3:	  OLS	  Regression	  Predicting	  Proposition	  8	  Vote	  Choice	  (Including	  Time	  Interactions)	  
Religion	   0.18***	  (.027)	  
Religion*August	   -­‐0.08*	  (.038)	  
Religion*September	   -­‐0.11**	  	  (.038)	  
August	   -­‐0.09	  (.136)	  
September	   -­‐0.11	  (.129)	  
Registered	  Democrat	   -­‐0.10**	  (.032)	  
Reg.	  Democrat*August	   0.04	  (.045)	  
Reg.	  Democrat*September	   -­‐0.02	  (.047)	  
Registered	  Republican	   0.09*	  (.036)	  
Reg.	  Republican*August	   0.02	  (.051)	  
Reg.	  Republican*September	   -­‐0.04	  (.051)	  
Education	   -­‐0.04	  (.050)	  
Education*August	   0.02	  (.071)	  
Education*September	   0.03	  (.070)	  
Prop	  8	  Important	   -­‐0.26***	  (.041)	  
Prop	  8	  Important*	  August	   0.06	  (.058)	  
Prop	  8	  Important	  *	  September	   -­‐0.01	  (.057)	  
Political	  Awareness	   0.05	  (.051)	  
Political	  Awareness*August	   -­‐0.01	  (.071)	  
Political	  Awareness*September	   0.0001	  (.074)	  
Political	  Orientation	   0.48***	  (.047)	  
Political	  Orientation*August	   -­‐0.02	  (.068)	  
Political	  Orientation*September	   0.05	  (.068)	  
White	   -­‐0.17*	  (.072)	  
White*August	   0.15	  (.104)	  
White*September	   0.10	  (.099)	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Continued	  
African	  American*August	   0.11	  (.124)	  
African	  American*September	   0.03	  (.119)	  
Hispanic	   -­‐0.07	  (.077)	  
Hispanic*August	   0.15	  (.112)	  
Hispanic*September	   0.08	  (.106)	  
Asian	   0.00	  (.087)	  
Asian*August	   0.11	  (.129)	  
Asian*September	   0.03	  (.132)	  
Married	   0.02	  (.028)	  
Married*August	   -­‐0.04	  (.040)	  
Married*September	   -­‐0.01	  (.040)	  
Children	   0.07*	  (.029)	  
Children*August	   0.00	  (.041)	  
Children*September	   -­‐0.01	  (.042)	  
Income	   -­‐0.04	  (.049)	  
Income*September	   -­‐0.07	  (.069)	  
Male	   0.04+	  (.024)	  
Male*August	   0.05	  (.035)	  
Male*September	   0.01	  (.035)	  
Age	   0.16***	  (.049)	  
Age*August	   -­‐0.09	  (.070)	  
Age*September	   -­‐0.03*	  (.071)	  
α: Constant	   .22	  (.093)	  
N	   3854	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Figure	  3:	  Proposition	  8	  Voting	  Distribution	  in	  California	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Figure	  4:	  California	  Population	  Density	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Figure	  5:	  Geoffrey	  Layman’s	  Path	  Model	  of	  Religious	  Influence	  on	  Political	  Behavior	  (Layman	  2001,	  253)	  
	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
(2)	  Orientation	  Toward	  Major	  Dimensions	  of	  Politics	  Conflict	  
Moral/Cultural	  Attitudes	  
Role	  of	  Government/Social	  Welfare	  
Attitudes	  
Defense/Military	  Attitudes	   	  
	  
(3)	  General	  Political	  Orientations	  
Ideological	  Identification	  
Party	  Identification	  
(4)	  Candidate	  Evaluations	  
Initiative	  Evaluations	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